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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the United States policy for establishing overseas military 
bases, particularly in Central Asia.  The major transformational trends in improving 
United States military capabilities over the past two decades, and the changing 
international security environment, have shaped the way American leaders focus on their 
global military posture strategy.  Immediately following the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attack, the United States moved quickly to establish a presence in Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, and after the defeat of the Taliban, several bases became available in 
Afghanistan.  Soviet military influence in Central Asia will be examined and compared to 
current United States policies and procedures.  While military bases still maintain several 
strategic advantages in terms of response times and maneuver, there needs to be an 
equally sized effort to explore how these bases can provide stability.  Achieving stability 
in Central Asia will require the United States to move away from the conventional 
ideology of basing, which it has used for many years, and to embrace policies and 
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A. THESIS OBJECTIVE 
This thesis will examine both the domestic and international policy implications 
associated with the establishment of long-term United States (U.S.) military presence in 
Central Asia.  Specifically, this thesis will focus on the implications of United States 
basing in the Central Asian region.  The strategic and tactical advantages of military 
installations in Central Asia were explicitly proven during Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).   
This thesis will assess the policy implications of permanent United States 
presence in this region.  United States presence in Central Asia has the potential to either 
cultivate stability in the region or aggravate an already volatile situation.  Past 
experiences in countries such as Germany and Japan after their defeat in World War II 
offer seemingly little direction as to the ultimate implications of United States military 
basing in Central Asia, in part, because the region presents unique challenges.  Central 
Asian challenges include: a legacy of corrupt and authoritarian regimes, intense Russian 
interest and influence in the areas, ethnic, tribal and religious societal tensions, and the 
emerging geopolitical importance of an area that is part of the so-called “arc of crisis.”1  
This thesis will systematically examine these challenges and, in so doing, offer policy 
prescriptions relative to Central Asian basing. 
B. THESIS RELEVANCE 
The presence of United States military in areas of the former Soviet Union and 
Warsaw Pact countries is a dynamic that will gain policy salience in the coming years.  
The fact that the United States was asked to leave Karshi-Kanabad Air Base, Uzbekistan, 
underscores the importance of an in-depth understanding of the unique challenges faced 
by the United States in the pursuit of bases in such countries. 
Prior to September 11, 2001, the United States had approximately a quarter-
million troops abroad.  More than 100,000 were stationed in Europe:  the majority of 
these were in Germany (75,000 troops total, almost 60,000 of them Army soldiers); 
                                                   
1 Term first used by Jimmy Carter in 1980 State of the Union address, but created by his National Security 
Advisor, Zbigniew Brzenzsky.  
2 
another 13,000 were in Italy, almost 12,000 in the United Kingdom, and smaller numbers 
elsewhere.  Nearly 100,000 American military personnel were in East Asia, divided 
between Japan, South Korea and the waters of the western Pacific.  About 25,000 were 
ashore and afloat in the Persian Gulf; smaller numbers were in Latin America and 
Africa.2  The policy prior to this date was to reduce overseas installations. 
During George W. Bush’s second presidential campaign, instead of closing 
locations in Europe, the discussion of U.S. overseas military presence focused on the 
restructuring of troops in Europe and reducing the number of military personnel by 
40,000 to 60,000.  According to United States Air Force General Charles Wald, there are 
currently “110,000 troops in Europe, mostly in and around Germany” and with the 
proposed reductions most would still be based in Germany.3  Most of the discussion to 
this point has centered on major base facilities, but currently there are “860 sites in 
foreign countries, including 305 in Germany, 158 in Japan, and 105 in South Korea.”4  
President Bush also acknowledged a desire to expand presence into Eastern Europe.  
Central Asia and Eastern Europe share a history replete with former Soviet Union 
influence.  United States’ attention to Russia in the execution of the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT) suggests that any actions by the United States in the former Soviet 
sphere of influence will face a number of daunting policy issues.  Issues such as 
authoritarian regimes, deep-seated corruption, ethnic fragmentation, human right 
violations, underdeveloped economies, as well as a host of other issues need to be 
considered when assessing the implications of American basing.  While some would 
argue that United States basing can have positive implications for such ills that plague 
Central Asia, others would argue that United States basing can contribute to these 
problems.  A major objective of this thesis is to address the positive as well as negative 
repercussions of United States basing on both the Central Asian domestic situations as 
well as United States foreign policy concerns. 
 
                                                   
2 United States Department of Defense. 1994.  Report on Overseas Basing, by Gary D. Vest.  Report to the 
Senate and House Armed Services Committees.  Washington, DC, March.  
3 Vince Crawley, Bush re-election may signal smaller European Command.  Air Force Times, 22 November 
2004, 33. 
4 Agence France Press.  “Pentagon to recommend base closures in U.S., Europe,” 12 May 2005.  
3 
C. RELEVANT LITERATURE 
The majority of the literature focusing on United States military basing discusses 
the strategic implications of basing abroad and the accepted benefits and potential costs.  
The five primary considerations of the United States military for potential basing 
opportunities, according to much of this literature, are:  the nature of relevant regional 
threats; geographical location of installation; number and types of forces stationed at 
location; existing facility inventory; and existing host nation agreements.  Noticeably 
absent from much of this literature is the base’s impact on the surrounding community—
it is certainly a factor, but is not often the significant consideration to United States 
basing strategies.  Aside from the discussion of strategic significance and security there is 
ample literature that discusses overseas basing as evidence of United States hegemony 
and empire-building. 
The Department of Defense has been tasked to develop a basing strategy that 
includes planning a redeployment of armed forces that will enable a military response to 
the threats of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, wherever 
they may occur.  The watchwords are “capabilities,” rather than specific threats, and 
“flexibility,” a clear statement that the intended targets for the use of United States 
military forces are not necessarily known in advance.  Dr. Gordon Adams, who currently 
teaches international affairs and national security at the Elliot School of International 
Affairs at Washington’s George Washington University and has written extensively on 
defense resource and planning issues suggests that the military has been strapped with a 
formidable task because all of the unknown parameters.  In an interview about military 
presence in Iraq, he said, “There’s a huge advantage to land-based infrastructure.  At the 
level of strategy it makes total sense.”5 
The impact on the surrounding community is a concern raised by authors such as 
C.T. Sandars and Chalmers Johnson.  Sandars’ work analyzed the terms and conditions 
under which American forces have been stationed in other countries since 1945, and 
highlights the wide range of bilateral relationships created as a result.  The most well-
known of these bilateral relationships were with postwar Germany and Japan, in which 
                                                   
5 Charles J. Hanley, “Elaborate U.S. bases raise long-term questions,” Daily News Headlines Digest, 21 
March 2006.  http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article12427.htm accessed 27 March 2006. 
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long-lasting political, military and economic ties have been created for decades.6  The 
United States was not establishing bases through conquest, but by securing basing rights 
through negotiation with independent sovereign states.  He also suggests that the reason 
the United States was so successful in basing rights following World War II was simply 
due to its economic strength.7  Johnson states that the “...vast network of American bases 
on every continent except Antarctica actually constitutes a new form of empire.”8  
Empires are defined as major political units that possess a territory of great extent, a 
number of territories or peoples under a single sovereign authority.  Johnson’s premise is 
that bases have taken the place of colonies and that bases translate into militarism, which 
ultimately lends itself to imperialism.  The end result is that the spread of bases will bring 
about financial insolvency and severely damage republican institutions, or the 
establishment of republican institutions in the host country.  The relationships between 
United States basing and such arguments will be examined by this thesis. 
Other areas of relevant literature cover a wide range of concerns and ideas.  The 
strategic significance of basing abroad is widely debated with pros and cons from both 
sides.  Before the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the push in the United States government was 
to bring more troops home from overseas citing lack of threat and surplus of costs as the 
primary drivers.  The Bush Administration’s proposal was the result of a review of 
United States global military basing arrangements that began in mid-2001, preceding the 
attack of September 11. Origins of the review can be traced to the 2001 Report of the 
statutory Quadrennial Defense Review, as well as the National Security Strategy of 2002.  
This review also led to the establishment of the Overseas Basing Commission.9  The 
primary concern was that basing arrangements are pre-dominantly a legacy of the United  
 
                                                   
6 Christopher T. Sandars, America’s Overseas Garrisons:  The Leasehold Empire.  (New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 38.   
7 Sandars, 90.  
8 Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire:  Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic.  (New 
York:  Metropolitan Books, 2004), 152. 
9 The Overseas Basing Commission, formally known as the Commission on the Review of Overseas 
Military Facility Structure of the United States, was established by the FY2004 Military Construction 
Appropriations Act (H.R. 2559/P.L. 108-132 of November 22, 2003). The commissioned is tasked to 
independently assess whether the current overseas basing structure is adequate to execute current missions, and 
to assess the feasibility of closures, realignments, or establishment of new installations overseas to meet 
emerging defense requirements. It has been active since May 2004. 
5 
States involvement in World War II and the Korean War, and that these basing 
arrangements are not optimal for responding to future military challenges in other 
geographical regions.10  
The fact that there was United States military presence in the Middle East was 
touted as one of the reasons by Osama bin Laden for the 9/11 attacks.  As the number of 
unstable situations continue to rise, the security for United States troops in increasingly 
hostile environments, to include bases, becomes harder to maintain.  Regions and nations 
that had been at the periphery of concern have taken on new importance because of their 
relationship to terrorists and the states that sponsor them.11  
A number of strategists believe there are also inherent risks in setting up bases in 
non-democratic states.  Basing agreements made with mature democracies involve far 
fewer risks.  Such deals come at no cost to U.S. legitimacy, and they tend to be more 
reliable since security commitments approved and validated by democratic institutions 
are made to last.  In non-democratic states, the mostly short-term benefits, rarely 
promotes liberalization, and sometimes even endangers United States security.  Engaging 
authoritarian leaders by striking basing deals with them has done little for 
democratization in those states because these leaders know that, ultimately, United States 
military planners care more about the bases' utility than about local political trends.12  
The practice can also jeopardize strategic interests.  Even as authoritarian leaders flout 
calls for liberalization, they often manipulate basing agreements to strengthen their 
personal standing at home, and when one of these autocrats is eventually ousted, the 
democratic successor sometimes challenges the validity of the deals the former regime 
had struck.  
D. KEY THESIS ASSUMPTIONS 
Can United States basing in Central Asia satisfy strategic objectives and 
simultaneously meet an important political goal of improved stability in the region?  The 
                                                   
10 Jon D. Klaus, U.S. Military Overseas Basing:  Background and Oversight Issues for Congress, (CRS 
Report for Congress, 17 November 2004), 5. 
11 Elizabeth Wishnick, Growing U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia, (Honolulu, Hawaii:  University 
Press of the Pacific, 2004), 16. 
12 Alexander Cooley, “Base Politics,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2005, 2. 
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Bush Administration’s official position is “security and democracy are indivisible”13, 
placing the promotion of democracy as a cornerstone of present United States foreign 
policy.  Yet in regions such as Central Asia, the governing regimes have been much more 
interested in the pursuit of stability at the expense of democracy, freedom, and human 
dignity.  The United States must realize that democracy does not automatically translate 
to stability, especially in Central Asia.  Security and democracy may not be indivisible, 
but they need to be connected with a chain of generous length.  Central Asian regimes 
understand the tenets of money and power, while the idea of democracy (as defined by 
the United States) may not be embraced.  The Central Asian experience following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union was one of reluctant independence with populations that 
experienced an overall decline in their quality of life.  Given the entrenched corruption of 
the authoritarian regimes in Central Asia, money and power alone are not enough to 
ensure lasting relationships.  Russia does not have the fiscal depth of the United States, 
but it enjoys a long (politically friendly) history with the region and has available 
instruments of power for use (geographic proximity, personnel, weapons, etc.)  China has 
less historical significance, but its future energy requirements have led to very significant 
financial investment in the region. 
E. THESIS METHODOLOGY AND KEY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary methodology of this thesis will center on case studies of military 
presence of the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Afghanistan.  Special emphasis will be placed on Karshi-Khanabad (K2) Air Base, 
Manas Air Base and Bagram Air Base respectively.  The case studies will zero in on the 
countries’ past relationship with the former Soviet Union (and current Russian 
government) and indicators that might predict success or failure.   Was the base presence 
a result of cooperation or occupation?   How critical are bases in Central Asia to Russia?  
How critical are bases in Central Asia to the United States?  Can the United States 
military presence help provide stability in the region?  How critical are bases to the host 
countries?  The last three questions will provide answers upon which to build future 
policy implications.  This set of questions will be asked with the Soviet regime and the 
                                                   
13 The Honorable Daniel Fried, Assistant United States Secretary of State, public address following talks in 
Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 27 September, 2005. 
7 
United States being the interchangeable variable.  There will also be a discussion of the 
reactions of Russia and China to having these United States bases in their “backyard.”  
Sources will include United States State Department, Department of Defense and other 
official government sources, as well as statements by Central Asian governments and 
scholars.  News sources will also be referenced to document impact at the local level, as 
well as national and international levels.  K2 will present an interesting case study since 
the United States has recently decided to honor Uzbekistan’s wishes and has relinquished 
the base. 
F. THESIS CONTENT 
This chapter introduced the most critical research questions and the methodology 
to be used in answering those questions.  Chapter II will examine United States interests 
in Central Asia with emphasis on its instant transformation into independent states.  Also 
addressed is interest of external entities in the natural resources of the region and the 
ever-increasing influence of the Shanghai Corporation Organization.  Soviet and Russian 
interest in Central Asia will be chartered from imperial times to current administration in 
Chapter III.  Chapter IV will look at Soviet-era and current Russian military presence 
and their impact in Central Asia’s historical and current political landscape, with an 
emphasis on Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan.  Inherent in this discussion is the 
fact that the United States and Russia have simultaneous military presence in Central 
Asia within the respective countries.  This comparison will hold even greater significance 
due to the discontinued presence of the United States at Karshi-Kanabad (K2) Air Base.  
The establishment of United States military presence at K2, Manas AB, Kyrgyzstan and 
Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan will be the primary focus of Chapter V.  The 
occupation versus invitation dynamic will be examined as it pertains to the specific 
challenges for the country in relation to United States objectives.  Chapter VI will 
outline the merits and challenges of military presence in Central Asia with specific 
recommendations for sustained presence in the region as well as considerations for future 
basing opportunities. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Central Asia is an interesting region with a number of dynamic aspects that were 
unknown to the United States for many years.  Instability, however, is one category that 
8 
is very familiar and combating sources of instability in Central Asia will require 
unconventional methods and strategies.  As the United States military finds itself waging 
a war against an unconventional foe; it is once again learning how difficult 
counterinsurgency operations actually are but continues to frame unconventional 
conflicts incorrectly.  This is telling since the enemy we face is likely to become more 
unconventional rather than more conventional.  Indeed, there is every reason to expect 
that the threat will become even more complex and more dispersed.  That transnational 
terrorists, localized insurgents, and transnational crime networks will become more 
intertwined is not only possible, but likely.  The fact that these kinds of threats are on the 
horizon is not a particularly newfound realization. Sam Sarkesian, in his 1993 book, 
Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era, wrote:  
The United States remains best prepared to fight the least likely wars 
(conventional European-style) and least prepared to fight the most likely 
wars (unconventional).14 
Military presence has used the conventional base to project an image of 
security and power.  True stability will come from unconventional use of 
the bases and their personnel.  
                                                   
14 Sam Sarkesian, Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era, Lessons form Malaya and Vietnam 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 1.  
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II. U.S. INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will be an examination of U.S. interests in Central Asia since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  Unlike Eastern Europe, the countries of Central Asia were 
easier to envelope into the Soviet fold due to tribal culture and lack of political 
aspirations.  This is not to say that the respective peoples enjoyed the Soviet influence, 
but their ability to handle their oppressive reality created a culture that is much more 
different than previously dealt with.  This chapter will also discuss the interest of external 
entities in the natural resources of the region. 
The only thing certain in today’s international environment is uncertainty.  This 
dynamic looms large in the restructuring of U.S. policy in a variety of areas—from 
homeland defense to overseas military basing.  The terrorist attack on September 11, 
2001 in the United States forced a new way of thinking about and combating a now 
dangerously lethal enemy.  As suspects were named and ties to Osama bin Laden and the 
Al Qaeda organization were verified, decisive military action against Al Qaeda’s base of 
operations was just a matter of time. Central Asia took center stage.  Every potential 
conflict has an operations plan associated with it to help guide the forces in obtaining 
objectives, but even these well thought-out plans did not envision United States military 
presence in countries such as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.   
September 11 galvanization the United States against terrorism, but relevant 
information involving the attacks and their implications were unclear.  The New York 
Times reported in October 2001 that the countries of Central Asia “are unknown to most 
Americans but are now being urgently courted as the United States seeks to destroy terror 
bases in nearby Afghanistan.”15    While it is true that most Americans were ignorant 
about Central Asia (and many still are) there were some organizations in the United 
States that were paying close attention to the developments there.  During the 1990s, 
                                                   
 
15 Stephen Kinzer, “Ex-Soviet Asian Republics Are Now Courted by the U.S.,” New York Times, 10 
October 2001, sec B, p. 7 (F). 
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United States policy toward Central Asia included many diverse interests—
denuclearization, economic reform, democracy, and energy utilization to name a few.   
In assessing U.S. involvement in Central Asia, this thesis will focus on three 
major objective areas: U.S. political, economic, and strategic interests.   
B. U.S. POLITICAL INTERESTS 
Central Asian political dynamics are critical for United States economic and 
strategic interests.  Central Asian history is critical for an understanding of U.S. interests 
in the region.  The people, tribal customs, and tough terrain are legendary.  This history 
became even more interesting as the emerging world superpowers, Great Britain and 
Russia attempted to control this part of the world to further their foreign policy 
ambitions.  In what became known as the “Great Game” these countries sent numerous 
spies and emissaries into Central Asia to map out territory and woo various leaders to 
side with them for economic and security purposes.  Eventually a succession of 
“ambitious Tsars and ruthless generals crushed the Muslim peoples” of Central Asia and 
occupied their lands.16  Great Britain, who had established a solid foothold in India 
became concerned that Russia would not stop until India was theirs.  This resulted in 
Great Britain’s infiltration of Central Asia in order to track and monitor Russian interests 
and maneuvers.   
President George H. W. Bush, who learned his foreign policy under the détente of 
Nixon, presided over the end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union.  He 
directed a foreign policy success in the Gulf by masterfully putting together the largest 
and most successful war coalition since the Second World War.  Financially speaking, 
the Gulf War cost the United States very little and Bush refused to expand the war 
beyond the limits set by United Nations resolutions and the United States Congress.17 
Many United States policy makers in the 1990s asserted that the United States 
was on the verge of becoming the unchallenged superpower.  President George H. W. 
Bush had announced a “New World Order” in 1990.  In 1991, the “evil empire” of the 
Soviet Union had formally dissolved.  The globe was open to the neo-liberal policies of 
                                                   
16 Peter Hopkirk.  The Great Game:  The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia.  (New York:  Kondansha 
International, 1994), xv.   
17 Cliff Staten, “U.S. Foreign Policy Since World War II:  An Essay on Reality’s Corrective Qualities,” 
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2005/0709/stat/staten_reality.html, accessed 5 November 2005.  
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privatization, de-regulation and market supremacy administered by new economic pacts 
such as North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas, (FTAA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) and it was believed that 
these organizations would help spread democracy and U.S. capitalism to the entire 
globe.18  In a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) document produced in 1992 about 
United States interpretation of the NIS, democracy was defined as: 
Democracy combines the right of citizens to exercise power by selecting 
their government through periodic, secret ballot, multiparty elections, and 
rule of law that limits government, guarantees freedom of speech, and 
protects the person, property, and civil rights of the population through an 
independent judiciary and other protective institutions.19 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the United States 
recognized the independence of all the former Central Asian republics and offered 
diplomatic relations to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which were viewed as following 
responsible security and democratic policies.  Citing the dangers the Central Asian states 
faced from Iranian-sponsored Islamic fundamentalism, United States diplomatic relations 
were quickly established with the remainder of the region by mid-March 1992.  Faced 
with calls in Congress and elsewhere to formulate a policy on aiding the New 
Independent States (NIS), former President George H. W. Bush sent the Freedom 
Support Act to Congress, which was signed into law on October 24, 1992. This law 
directed the President to designate a responsible agent to coordinate assistance to the 
independent states of the former Soviet Union and report an overall assistance and 
economic strategy.20  The incoming Clinton Administration in 1993 soon pledged to 
focus on close ties with the NIS as a top foreign policy priority. 
The major goals of former Clinton Administration policy toward the NIS, 
including Central Asia, entailed fostering stability, democratization, free market 
economies and trade, denuclearization in the non-Russian states, and adherence to 
international human rights standards.  These positive policy goals were supported by 
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another priority—to discourage attempts by radical regimes and groups to block or 
subvert progress toward these goals or otherwise threaten regional peace and stability.  
While a consensus appeared to exist among most United States policymakers and other 
government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on the general desirability of 
these goals, there were various views on the types and levels of United States 
involvement.  
Many of those who endorsed continued or enhanced United States support for 
Central Asia, including Ambassador Lynn Pascoe, argued that political instability in 
Central Asia could produce spillover effects in important nearby states, including United 
States allies and friends such as Turkey.21  They also argued that the United States had a 
major interest in preventing terrorist regimes or groups from illicitly acquiring nuclear 
weapons-related materials and technology in the region.  They maintained that United 
States interests do not perfectly coincide with those of its allies and friends, that Turkey 
and other actors possessed limited aid resources, and that the United States was in the 
strongest position as a superpower to influence democratization and respect for human 
rights.  They stressed that United States leadership in world efforts to provide 
humanitarian and economic reform aid would help alleviate the high levels of social 
distress that were exploited by anti-Western Islamic extremist groups seeking new 
members.  Although many United States policymakers acknowledged a role for a 
democratizing Russia in the region, they stressed that United States and other Western aid 
and investment strengthen the independence of the states and forestall Russian attempts 
to re-subjugate the region. 
Daniel Rosenblum, Deputy Coordinator, U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, 
Department of State, objected to aspects of past policy toward Central Asia and argued 
that the United States has historically had few interests in this region and that 
developments there remained marginal to United States interests.  He advocated limited 
United States contacts undertaken with Turkey and other friends and allies to ensure 
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United States interests.22  Many discounted fears that an anti-Western Islamic extremism, 
such as that fostered by Iran or Afghanistan’s Taliban group, would make headway, or 
that Russia would seek or be able to re-subjugate the region.  They questioned whether 
the oil and other natural resources in these new states were vital to United States security 
and point out that oil resources were, in any event, unlikely to be fully available to 
Western markets for many years.  Some also criticized aid for democratization among 
cultures they view as historically attuned to authoritarianism.  Others, such as Jeanne 
Kirkpatrick, former Ambassador to the United Nations under Ronald Reagan, urged 
reducing or cutting off most aid to repressive governments that widely violate human 
rights, arguing that such aid provides tacit support for these regimes, and may even 
unwittingly encourage the rise of Islamic fundamentalism as an alternative channel of 
dissent.23  Some pointed to lingering instability in Tajikistan and elsewhere in the region 
as another reason for the United States to steer clear of major involvement that might 
place more United States personnel and citizens in danger.24 
The United States encouraged the Central Asian states to become responsible 
members of the international community, and supported their admission to the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO bodies, and other 
Western organizations.  The Clinton Administration supported these integrative goals 
through bilateral aid and through coordination with other aid donors, including regional 
powers such as Turkey.  This and other means were used to discourage radical regimes, 
groups, and Islamic fundamentalists—who used repression or violence to oppose 
democratization—from attempts to gain influence.  With declarations of independence, 
all the Central Asian states professed desires for good relations with both East and West 
as a means of demonstrating independence, and certain opportunism has been evident in 
the quest for relations with aid donors.  All of the Central Asian leaders publicly 
embraced Islam, but displayed hostility toward Islamic fundamentalism.  At the same 
time, they established some trade and aid ties with Iran.  While they had greater success 
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in attracting development aid from the West than from the East, many observers argued 
that, in the long run, their foreign policies will probably not be anti-Western, but may be 
more oriented toward Islamic states and interests.25  
In congressional testimony on March 17, 1999, then-Ambassador-at-Large for the 
NIS Steve Sestanovich stated that the over-arching goal of United States policy in Central 
Asia was to secure the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the states. 
This goal was being pursued by advocating democratization (because it is “the long-term 
guarantor of stability and prosperity”), free markets, cooperation within the region 
(including on building east-west pipelines and on defense) and its integration into the 
Euro-Atlantic community, and responsible security policies (including nonproliferation, 
counter-terrorism, and counter-narcotics). Although the states were making halting 
progress in some areas, he stated, the Administration was committed to continue working 
with them.  In testimony in May 1998, Sestanovich stated that the United States had a 
“big stake” in assisting the peaceful and historic integration of Central Asia and the South 
Caucasus into the world community, interests that were seen as “strategic” and “vital.”26 
During immediate Central Asian independence U.S. diplomatic and other ties 
have greatly increased in all the Central Asian states.  A U.S.-Kazakh Joint Commission 
held its first meeting in November 1994, chaired by Vice President Gore and President 
Nazarbayev.  A U.S.-Uzbekistan Joint Commission, highlighting the Administration’s 
view that “in geopolitical terms [and] commercially, [Uzbekistan] is a very important 
country for the United States,” held its first meeting in February 1998. Although these 
commissions were not retained by President George W. Bush’s Administration, some of 
their working groups and other forums continued to address bilateral issues of concern.27 
While bilateral issues were being addressed, leaders in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, 
and Kyrgyzstan grew increasingly alarmed that Central Asian radical Islamic movements 
were receiving safe haven in Afghanistan.  In 1996, several of these states banded 
together with Russia and China into a regional grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation 
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Organization (SCO).  Initial discussions centered on the potential threats emanating from 
Afghanistan’s Taliban regime and how to address these threats.  Of the Central Asian 
states that border Afghanistan, two of them—Uzbekistan and Tajikistan—had seen 
themselves as particularly vulnerable to militant factions harbored by the Taliban.28 
Former National Security Adviser for President Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski published a book in which he portrays the Eurasian landmass as the key to 
world power, and Central Asia with its vast oil reserves as the key to domination of 
Eurasia.  He states that for the United States to maintain its global primacy, it must 
prevent any possible adversary from controlling that region.  He predicts that because of 
popular resistance to United States military expansionism, his ambitious Central Asian 
strategy can not be implemented “except in the circumstance of a truly massive and 
widely perceived direct external threat.”29 
C. U.S. ECONOMIC INTERESTS 
The Central Asian states, the poorest part of the former Soviet Union, witnessed 
steep declines in gross domestic product (GDP) after they gained independence.  Average 
per capita income in the region, according to the World Bank, was less than $800 in 
1999, with Tajikistan described by the Asian Development Bank as one of the poorest 
countries in the world.  The declines in GDP appeared to reverse in the late 1990s in all 
the states, but their economies remain fragile.  The Kazakh and Turkmen economies are 
dependent on energy exports; if export revenues decline, the regimes may collapse.  
Economic growth was increasingly threatened by corruption, the deteriorating health of 
the populations, and crime, including that linked to drug trafficking and production.  
Except for Kazakhstan, the Central Asian states were unlikely soon to gain substantial 
revenues from oil, gas, or other development, suggesting that they may be vulnerable to 
popular discontent and instability for several years.  Lagging economic reform in 
Uzbekistan led the IMF to suspend lending to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is levied more conditions 
on its economic reform lending to Turkmenistan. 
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The United States defines a market economy as one that: 
allows private ownership and entrepreneurship, a free price mechanism, a 
predominant private sector, openness to foreign participation, and limited 
government regulation.30 
Support for private sector development had been a major component of United 
States aid efforts in the NIS.  Technical assistance and training programs supporting the 
creation of market economies have included those dealing with entrepreneurship, 
agribusiness, small business development, telecommunications, banking, defense 
conversion, tax policy, bankruptcy, and labor management.  A Central Asian-American 
Enterprise Fund (CAAEF) was set up in 1994, with Congressional authorization to lend 
up to $150 million.  The Fund’s regional offices had obligated $111 million in loans to 
over 400 small- and medium-size private enterprises.  CAAEF reports a difficult small-
business climate and wrote off losses of about $30.5 million.  A memorandum on United 
States advice for Kazakh defense industrial conversion was signed during Nazarbayev’s 
1994 United States visit.  Joint committees for defense conversion were set up with 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan planned United States aid in converting state enterprises to 
privately held, non-defense firms.  Peace Corps volunteers taught small business 
development and English language and served in all of the Central Asian states except 
Tajikistan. 
The United Nations World Food Program reported in February 2001 that it was 
hard-pressed to meet urgent food needs by up to three million or more people in drought-
stricken Tajikistan.  Uzbekistan again appealed to the U.N. in January for urgent food aid 
for up to one million people because of drought in its Karakalpakstan and Khorezm 
regions (a UN mission in December 2000 assessed urgent food needs for 45,000 people).  
Responding to Uzbekistan’s food needs, the United States Department of Agriculture in 
early 2001 announced a $20 million Food for Progress concessional sale of soybeans, 
rice, and other grains.31 
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The Clinton Administration stressed that United States support for free market 
reforms directly served United States national interests by opening new markets for 
United States goods and services, and sources of energy and minerals.  United States 
private investment committed to Central Asia has greatly exceeded that provided to 
Russia or most other NIS except Azerbaijan, although the region is relatively isolated and 
the states lag behind Russia in accommodating commercial ties.  United States energy 
companies have committed to invest billions of dollars in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan.32 United States trade agreements have been signed and entered into force 
with all the Central Asian states.  Duty-free access to United States markets under the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is in effect for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Uzbekistan.  Kyrgyzstan has received normal trade relations status and Jackson-Vanik 
trade provisions calling for presidential reports and waivers no longer apply. 
The Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) has obligated funds for short-term 
insurance, loans, or guarantees for export sales of industrial and agricultural equipment 
and bulk agricultural commodities to all the states except Tajikistan.  The Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has signed agreements with all the Central Asian 
states on ensuring United States private investments overseas, and has obligated funds for 
financing or insurance in all the states except Tajikistan.  The United States Commerce 
Department has set up a Business Development Committee with Kazakhstan to facilitate 
official discussions on trade and economic issues. 
The Foreign Commercial Service (FCS) opened offices in Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan in 1993, and co-located American Business Centers were opened in 1994. 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have large oil and natural gas reserves, and the 
other states of the region possess potential sources of export earnings, but major 
investments are needed to revamp, develop, or market these resources in most cases.  
Uzbekistan’s cotton and gold production rank among the highest in the world and much 
is exported.  It also has moderate oil and gas reserves.  Kyrgyzstan owns major gold 
mines and strategic mineral reserves, and is a major wool producer.  Tajikistan has one of 
the world’s largest aluminum processing plants (exporting over $300 million worth in 
1999) and is a major cotton grower. 
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Cotton, however, is not the only thing that comes out of the ground in Central 
Asia—a land locked, 1.5 million square miles of primarily mountainous terrain and 
deserts.  The United States Department of Energy (DOE) reports estimates of 10-17.6 
billion barrels of proven oil reserves and 53-83 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in 
Kazakhstan, and 98-155 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves in Turkmenistan.  
Kazakhstan’s Tengiz oil field began to be exploited by Chevron and Kazakhstan in a joint 
venture during 1993 (U.S. Mobil Oil and Russia’s LUKoil later joined).  In April 2001, 
the joint venture announced that Tengiz reserves were much higher than previously 
thought.  Kazakhstan announced in May 2000 that a consortium (including United States 
firms Exxon-Mobil and Phillips Petroleum) had found "big deposits of oil" in the 
Kashagan field in the north Caspian Sea.  Another successful test well in early 2001 
strengthened prospects of a major oil find.   
The Clinton Administration viewed the oil find as “a tremendously important 
boost” to plans for a pipeline from Baku, Azerbaijan to Ceyhan, Turkey, though some 
experts questioned whether it would be economical to barge this oil to Baku or build a 
connecting pipeline.  Russia’s restrictions on Tengiz oil exports to Europe were eased 
slightly in 1996 after the consortium admitted LUKoil, and after Gazprom was admitted 
to another consortium.33  Russia easily agreed to Kazakhstan’s requested oil transit 
quotas for 2001, however, in order to persuade it that the planned Baku-Ceyhan pipeline 
was not needed.  The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC; formed in 1992 but 
restructured in 1996) protocol grants Russian interests the largest share, 44%, with the 
remainder held by U.S., other Western, and Omani partners.  Initial construction was 
completed in November 2000 on a 930-mile oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to Russia’s 
Black Sea port of Novorossiisk, to initially carry up to one million barrels per day when 
fully operational in late 2001.  This is the region’s first new large-capacity pipeline. 
For FY1998, the Clinton Administration called for added civil society assistance 
for the NIS, particularly for Russia and Central Asia.  However, Congressional earmarks 
fenced off much of the NIS aid, so Central Asia benefited little.  Increased appropriations 
in FY1999 permitted a 26% increase for Central Asia to $136.9 million, but in FY2000, 
earmarks and priorities led to an allocation of $112 million.  Estimated spending in 
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FY2001 was $115.95 million.  For FY2002, the Administration requested slightly less for 
Central Asia, $110 million, as part of its $808 million NIS request. 
U.S. policy goals regarding energy resources in the Central Asian and South 
Caucasian states have included supporting their sovereignty and ties to the West, 
supporting United States private investment, breaking Russia’s monopoly over oil and 
gas transport routes by encouraging the building of pipelines that do not traverse Russia, 
promoting Western energy security through diversified suppliers, assisting ally Turkey, 
and opposing the building of pipelines that transit “energy competitor” Iran or otherwise 
give it undue influence over the region.  To carry out these goals, the Clinton 
Administration endorsed building trans-Caucasus oil and gas pipelines to Turkey, with 
trans-Caspian links to Central Asia, as part of a “Eurasian Transport Corridor” plan given 
impetus in 1997.  In 1998, a Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State 
for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy was appointed to coordinate TDA, OPIC, 
Eximbank and other agency programs to ensure the “development of the Caspian and 
open commercial access to its energy” (this post was retained in the new Bush 
Administration).  In 1999, TDA, OPIC, and Eximbank opened a Caspian Finance Center 
in Turkey. 
The policy of the Bush Administration regarding Caspian energy development 
was explicated by Ambassador Elizabeth Jones, Senior Advisor on Caspian Basin Energy 
diplomacy.  In a State Department televised interview with residents of the region on 
April 12, 2001, she stated that the United States would continue to support the Baku-
Ceyhan pipeline and other approaches of the previous administration.  She also stated that 
the United States would not intervene with force to halt incursions by Islamic terrorists 
into the region, but would help regional states to defend themselves through NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace and by providing counter-terrorism aid.  The Central Asian states 
have been pressured by Russia to yield portions of their energy wealth to Russia, in part 
because Russia controls most existing pipelines to export markets. 
Among the NIS, Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia ranked highest in 
cumulative United States government aid obligated as of September 30, 2000, with most 
Central Asian states receiving much less (including food, medical, and technical aid, and 
aid for nuclear weapons disarmament and safeguards for Kazakhstan).  Kazakhstan and 
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Kyrgyzstan were exceptions, with Kazakhstan ranked fifth ($684.22 million, slightly less 
than aid to Georgia) and Kyrgyzstan sixth ($484.23 million).  In per capita terms, 
Kyrgyzstan has ranked in the top five aid recipients among the NIS.  Humanitarian and 
health care aid for Tajikistan has been a special concern since FY1994, but Tajiks have 
said that the United States government has failed to provide aid promised for rebuilding 
after the Tajik civil war.  The World Bank held a third consultative group meeting of 
international donors in Tokyo, Japan, on May 15, 2001, to focus on rebuilding assistance 
for post-war Tajikistan for 2001-2002.  Six countries, including Japan and Switzerland, 
and international lenders pledged $430 million in aid.  The United States, an observer of 
the Tajik peace process, pledged no added aid.34 
The value of Defense Department excess commodities and privately donated aid 
transported at United States expense are not included in the cumulative obligations in the 
table, but were $166.54 million for Kazakhstan, $121.47 million for Kyrgyzstan, $38.25 
million for Tajikistan, $39.94 million for Turkmenistan, and $114.46 million for 
Uzbekistan. 
Consolidated Appropriations for fiscal year 2000 included the “Silk Road 
Strategy Act” authorizing language calling for enhanced policy and aid to support 
conflict amelioration, humanitarian needs, economic development, transport and 
communications, border controls, democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the 
South Caucasus and Central Asia.35 
Besides bilateral and regional aid, the United States contributes to international 
financial institutions and nongovernmental organizations that aid Central Asia. Policy 
issues regarding United States aid include whether the states are properly using it, what it 
should be used for, and who should receive it. 
D. U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS 
The might of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was the primary 
concern of United States military strategist for over forty years.  Although not in direct 
confrontation, wars in Korea and Vietnam cemented the opposing ideologies.  As the 
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Western world recovered from the surprise of a collapsed Soviet Union, the regimes of 
Central Asia were recovering from shock of sudden independence.  This sudden 
independence forced the existing regimes to scramble to establish ties strong ties with 
Russia in some cases (Tajikistan) and a more independent stance with others, such as 
Kazakhstan.    As the Warsaw Pact disintegrated, attention turned to security concerns.  
Since it gained independence from the Soviet Union, the military actually sent teams into 
these new countries to survey airfields and itemize potential uses for strategic uses, but 
no official political interest was expressed until the GWOT. 
Immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the level of nuclear 
threat confronting the United States was significantly reduced; however, an estimated 
30,000 nuclear warheads were spread among the former Soviet Republics36.  The dangers 
posed by this situation were evident—primarily diversion or unauthorized use of 
weapons, materials, or knowledge.  In 1991, Congress initiated the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction (CTR) program to reduce the threat to the United States from these weapons 
and promote denuclearization, demilitarization, and reduce weapons proliferation in the 
NIS.37  This was a very successful program.  In 1998 there was a United States-
Uzbekistan Joint Commission to discuss the dismantling and decontamination of a 
biological weapons facility, and this was completed in 1999.  Another hugely successful 
venture.  
Because of the harsh terrain Central Asia is sparsely populated with the majority 
of the populations residing within or near the Ferghana Valley—a stretch of fertile land.  
It has the natural boundary of the coast of the Caspian Sea in the west; the Hindu Kush 
and Pamir mountain ranges (roof of the world) in the south; and the Tian Shan mountains 
in the west.  The neighbors include Iran and Afghanistan to the south; China to the east; 
and Russia to north and west.  There are no clear geographical boundaries in the north 
with Russia.  This area has other colorful names such as “backyard” or “underbelly” in 
description of Russia’s security concerns.  As independence moved throughout the 
region, civil war erupted in Tajikistan. 
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The American perspective on the Tajik civil war (1992-96) was that it was a 
power struggle involving clans or regional cliques, and was engineered by Russia with a 
view to justifying its military presence in Central Asia. But, its reasoning was seriously 
flawed - that there were no Islamist elements in Afghanistan interested in a spillover into 
Central Asia; the Taliban was an indigenous Afghan phenomenon who did not have any 
regional agenda; Afghan fratricidal strife was purely about capturing power in Kabul; and 
that the Taliban would be ultimately a factor of regional stability. Americans were not 
alone living in a different intellectual universe. “French scholar Olivier Roy laughed off 
the very thought that there could be ‘revolution-exporting Islamic fundamentalists in 
Afghanistan.’”38  Although this may not have been a serious concern, the Central Asian 
Economic Community (CAEC) did want to address military and security cooperation in 
the area. 
The Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion exercise CENTRASBAT is a series of 
exercises designed to improve interaction with the Central Asian states by focusing on 
peacekeeping/humanitarian operations and exercising command, control, and logistics 
within a multinational framework.  Focused on strengthening military-to-military 
relationships and regional security between Central Asian and other regional militaries, 
the first exercise took place in 1995.  Military units from the national peacekeeping 
battalions of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, as well as a United States 
battalion, used this exercise as a tool to increase interoperability and improve the 
participating forces' abilities to conduct basic peacekeeping and humanitarian 
operations.39 The exercises have a practical significance for NATO countries, which have 
on repeated occasions since 1997 been able to test in practice their theoretical 
calculations on getting their units to the Central Asian region by air, and to study and 
work out in practice methods of making assault landings in various sectors, taking into 
account the local conditions and the terrain and, have been able to make adjustments to 
training. 
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Beginning in 1998, if not before, Uzbekistan and the United States conducted 
joint covert operations against Afghanistan's Taliban regime and bin Laden.40  By the 
start of the year 2000, this year, the United States had already begun “to quietly build 
influence” in Central Asia.  The United States has established significant military-to-
military relationships with Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. Americans have 
trained soldiers from those countries.  The militaries of all three have an ongoing 
relationship with the National Guard of a United States state—Kazakhstan with Arizona, 
Kyrgyzstan with Montana, and Uzbekistan with Louisiana.  The countries also participate 
in NATO's Partnership for Peace program.41 
Central Asia Border Security Initiative appropriated $70m for customs and border 
guard training, anti-terrorism assistance and communication, observation, and detection 
equipment.42  General Tommy Franks, then United States Central Command 
Commander, tours Central Asia in 2000 in an attempt to build military aid relationships 
with nations there, but was unsuccessful.  Russia's power in the region appeared to be on 
the upswing instead. Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev writes, “The actions of 
Islamic extremists in Central Asia give Russia the chance to strengthen its position in the 
region.”43  General Franks, later to head the United States occupation of Afghanistan, 
visits the capital of Tajikistan. He says the Bush Administration considers Tajikistan “a 
strategically significant country” and offers military aid.44  As in most strategic 
situations, the military has, at the very least, compiled a list of potential locations in 
which to perform future operations, so it is not hard to believe that discussions about 
future cooperation would have taken place in the 90s.  These plans were then put on the 
shelf for the “if and when” something happens. 
                                                   
40 Thomas E. Ricks and Susan B. Glasser, “U.S. Operated Secret Alliance with Uzbekistan,”  The 
Washington Post, 14 October 2001, p. A01.  
41 Robert G. Kaiser, “U.S. Plants Footprint in Shaky Central Asia, “ The Washington Post, 27 August 2002, 
p. A01.  
42 A. Elizabeth Jones, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs 
Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Central Asia and the Caucasus, 
Washington, DC, 13 December 2001.  U.S.-Central Asian Cooperation  
43 Ian Traynor, War In Afghanistan:  Russia Edgy at America’s Military Build-Up in Region,” The 
Guardian, 10 January 2002.  
44 David Leigh, “Attack and Counter-attack,” The Guardian, 26 September 2001.  
24 
The Clinton Administration's approach to the regions was ad hoc.  It tackled a 
laundry list of initiatives in response to crises and shifting policy priorities.  Issues such 
as oil and gas pipelines, conflict resolution, and human rights were targeted at different 
junctures, but an overall strategy—which was essential, given limited government 
resources for the regions—was never fully articulated.  As a result, United States 
priorities were not communicated clearly to local leaders, resulting in frequent 
misinterpretations of intentions.  Domestic constituencies in the United States 
undermined leverage in regional conflicts.45 Incompatible government structures and 
conflicting legislation fostered competition among agencies and encouraged a 
proliferation of parallel initiatives, while congressional mandates limited areas in which 
scarce funds could be applied and thus reduced flexibility. 
In fairness to the administrations, it is important to note that while the relatively 
peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union was welcomed, and the generation of more than a 
dozen independent states was exciting (especially to a democratic nation such as the 
United States), there were other world events competing for its attention.  Operation 
Desert Storm began and ended; Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern 
Watch became a fixture in United States deployments.  There were now new bases in the 
Middle East (Saudi Arabia) and a large military presence in the former Yugoslavia.  This 
military presence beyond normal allied soil was a foreshadowing of what would become 
the norm.  Given the enormous amount of change in the decade of the 90s, the United 
States managed to create some relationships in a region where it had NO influence prior.  
Hindsight is 20/20, but most of the initiatives into this region were positive.   
E.   CONCLUSION 
Anything effecting United States policy can now be divided into pre- and post-
September 11.  At the heart of the current defense strategy is the Pentagon's desire to 
have the option to strike first in a post-September 11 world, where future threats are 
unpredictable.  The uncertainty is highlighted by the fact that the threats are emerging 
from lawless or less developed regions.  This is especially true when discussing United 
States basing abroad.  During his 2000 presidential election campaign, then presidential 
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candidate Bush vehemently defended bringing more troops back to the United States as 
he criticized the Clinton Administration for allowing the military to be spread too thin.46  
The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, caused a reversal in this mindset as troops 
deployed to new locations throughout the world to conduct the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT).  Although terrorism is not new, the lethality and reach has pushed it to the front 
for policy considerations. 
Current world situations dictate that the United States pursue expanding allied 
roles and building new partnerships.  Uncertainty is the only known and it is important to 
develop policies that include flexibility to deal with that uncertainty.  During the Cold 
War, it was standard to believe that you would fight where you were based, but the last 
15 years have proven that that is no longer the case.  Taking advantage of existing 
partnerships is the logical course to take. 
There are some inherent risks associated with this concept.  One of these risks in 
Central Asia is operating in a location that has a long history with Russia.  In fact, 
actually sharing the same resources and airspace is a new experience.  As can be 
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III. SOVIET/RUSSIAN INTEREST IN CENTRAL ASIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will focus on historical Soviet interest and policies in Central Asia, 
with a heavy emphasis on Russian interest following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991. While it is known that the Soviets did not have a documented military strategy, it 
did have a political objective of presence that was meant to be a visible reminder of the 
might of the Soviet Union.  This extensive presence was extended into Central Asia 
through its satellite, or backyard, countries to include extensive nuclear capabilities.  
After invading Afghanistan, the establishment of numerous bases in that country 
represented the first openly consistent military presence outside of the Soviet Union 
(other than Cuba) in decades.  Russia is now faced with re-establishing military presence 
by negotiation and compromise in a region it all but abandoned in 1991 as other 
countries, namely the United States and China, take a decidedly stronger interest.     
B. BACKGROUND 
Historically, the states of Central Asia have been shaped by a number of factors 
and personalities that include Islam, the great Mongo invasion, isolation, Russian 
imperialism, and Sovietization.  Silk Road cities, such as Bukhara and Samarkand, were 
important to the Muslim world long before political boundaries were drawn.  The region 
experienced another period of isolation after the discovery of a sea route from Europe to 
China that made the Silk Road less traveled.  Russian tsars of the 18th and 19th centuries 
continued to slowly move into Central Asia bringing new political and economic 
subordination with them.  
In addition, Central Asia has always had an interesting history.  The people, tribal 
customs, and tough terrain are legendary.  This history became even more interesting as 
the emerging world superpowers, Great Britain and Russia attempted to control this part 
of the world for various reasons.  In what became known as the “Great Game” these 
countries sent numerous spies and emissaries into Central Asia to map out territory and 
woo various leaders to side with them for economic and security purposes.  Eventually a 
succession of “ambitious Tsars and ruthless generals crushed the Muslim peoples” of 
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Central Asia and occupied their lands.47  Great Britain, who had established a solid 
foothold in India became concerned that Russia would not stop until India was theirs 
began to infiltrate North to keep an eye on the Russians.  Following the Bolshevik 
Revolution, the courtship of Central Asia was not very extensive.  While the newly 
created Soviet states of Central Asia experienced similar beginnings, a brief history of 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan will be provided because they the primary topics of this 
essay. 
1. Uzbekistan  
Uzbekistan is the most populous of the five Central Asian states and the only one 
that shares a border with the other four.  Under the weight of Moscow’s quota-driven 
central planners, cotton came to dominate other agricultural and industrial endeavors 
resulting in a severely degraded environment.48  While the Bolsheviks encouraged a 
certain level of cultural awareness in Uzbekistan, Stalin replaced the Uzbeki leaders with 
his own loyalist.  These systematic replacements would ensure Soviet dominance for 
many years, as well as establish the basis for corruption in government. 
Located in the heart of Central Asia between the Amu Darya and Syr Darya 
Rivers, Uzbekistan has a long and interesting heritage.  The leading cities of the famous 
Silk Road—Samarkand, Bukhara, and Khiva—are located in Uzbekistan, and many well-
known conquerors passed through the land.  Alexander the Great stopped near 
Samarkand on his way to India in 327 B.C. and married Roxanna, daughter of a local 
chieftain. Conquered by Muslim Arabs in the eight century A.D., the indigenous Samanid 
dynasty established an empire in the ninth century.  Genghis Khan and his Mongols 
overran its territory in 1220.  In the 1300s, Timur, known in the west as Tamerlane, built 
an empire with its capital at Samarkand.  Uzbekistan's most noted tourist sites date from 
the Timurid dynasty.  Later, separate Muslim city-states emerged with strong ties to 
Persia.  In 1865, Russia occupied Tashkent and by the end of the nineteenth century, 
Russia had conquered all of Central Asia.  In 1876, the Russians dissolved the Khanate of 
Kokand, while allowing the Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara to remain as direct 
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protectorates.  Russia placed the rest of Central Asia under colonial administration, and 
invested in the development of Central Asia's infrastructure, promoting cotton growing 
and encouraging settlement by Russian colonists.  
In 1924, following the establishment of Soviet power, the Soviet Socialist 
Republic of Uzbekistan was founded from the territories including the Khanates of 
Bukhara and Khiva and portions of the Fergana Valley that had constituted the Khanate 
of Kokand. During the Soviet era, Moscow used Uzbekistan for its tremendous cotton 
growing and natural resource potential. The extensive and inefficient irrigation used to 
support the former has been the main cause of shrinkage of the Aral Sea to less than a 
third of its original volume, making this one of the world's worst environmental disasters. 
Uzbekistan declared independence on September 1, 1991. Islam Karimov, former First 
Secretary of the Communist Party, was elected President in December 1991 with 88 
percent of the vote; however, the election was not viewed as free or fair by foreign 
observers. 
Uzbekistan possesses the largest and most competent military forces in the 
Central Asian region, having around 65,000 people in uniform. Its structure is inherited 
from the Soviet armed forces, although it is moving rapidly toward a fully restructured 
organization, which will eventually be built around light and Special Forces. The Uzbek 
Armed Forces' equipment is not modern, and training, while improving, is neither 
uniform nor adequate yet for its new mission of territorial security. The government has 
accepted the arms control obligations of the former Soviet Union, acceded to the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (as a non-nuclear state), and has supported an active program by 
the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) in western Uzbekistan (Nukus and 
Vozrozhdeniye Island). The Government of Uzbekistan spends about 3.7 percent of GDP 
on the military but has received a growing infusion of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 
and other security assistance funds since 1998.49 
2. Kyrgyzstan  
According to recent findings of Kyrgyz and Chinese historians, Kyrgyz history 
dates back to 201 B.C. The earliest descendents of the Kyrgyz people, who are believed 
to be of Turkic descent, lived in the northeastern part of what is currently Mongolia. 
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Later, some of their tribes migrated to the region that is currently southern Siberia and 
settled along the Yenisey River, where they lived from the sixth until the eighth centuries. 
They spread across what is now the Tuva region of the Russian Federation, remaining in 
that area until the rise of the Mongol Empire in the 13th century, when the Kyrgyz began 
migrating south. In the twelfth century, Islam became the predominant religion in the 
region. Most Kyrgyz are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi school.  
During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Kyrgyz people settled in the 
territory currently known as the Kyrgyz Republic. In the early nineteenth century, the 
southern territory of the Kyrgyz Republic came under the control of the Khanate of 
Kokand, and the territory was formally incorporated into the Russian Empire in 1876. 
The Russian takeover instigated numerous revolts against tsarist authority, and many 
Kyrgyz opted to move into the Pamir mountains or to Afghanistan. The suppression of 
the 1916 rebellion in Central Asia caused many Kyrgyz to migrate to China.  
Soviet power was initially established in the region in 1918, and in 1924, the 
Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast was created within the Russian Federal Socialist 
Republic. (The term Kara-Kyrgyz was used until the mid-1920s by the Russians to 
distinguish them from the Kazakhs, who were also referred to as Kyrgyz.) In 1926, it 
became the Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. On December 5, 1936, the 
Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) was established as a full Union Republic of the 
U.S.S.R.  
During the 1920s, the Kyrgyz Republic saw considerable cultural, educational, 
and social change. Economic and social development also was notable. Literacy 
increased, and a standard literary language was introduced. The Kyrgyz language belongs 
to the Southern Turkic group of languages. In 1924, an Arabic-based Kyrgyz alphabet 
was introduced, which was replaced by Latin script in 1928. In 1941 Cyrillic script was 
adopted. Many aspects of the Kyrgyz national culture were retained despite suppression 
of nationalist activity under Joseph Stalin, who controlled the Soviet Union from the late 
1920s until 1953. Kyrgyzstan bore the brunt of Stalin’s efforts to russify Central Asia in 




the native population.  Native leaders were replaced by Russian loyalist who assumed 
control of the government and the economy.  Kyrgyzstan became a dependable source of 
cheap raw materials.50    
The early years of glasnost in the late 1980s had little effect on the political 
climate in the Kyrgyz Republic. However, the republic's press was permitted to adopt a 
more liberal stance and to establish a new publication, Literaturny Kirghizstan, by the 
Union of Writers. Unofficial political groups were forbidden, but several groups that 
emerged in 1989 to deal with an acute housing crisis were permitted to function. In June 
1990, ethnic tensions between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz surfaced in an area of the Osh Oblast, 
where Uzbeks form a majority of the population. Violent confrontations ensued, and a 
state of emergency and curfew were introduced.51 
C. SOVIET UNION  
The re-conquest of the region by the Soviets brought increased development, as 
well as new administrative divisions responsible for that development in the Union 
Republics.  The separate Soviet administrative districts provided not only the boundaries 
for the new states but a comprehensive plan for creating a subordinate administrative 
structure. 
The Soviet purpose was not to create new nations but to manage a multinational 
empire.  They wanted to deepen divisions in this Islamic region, while rewarding those 
that furthered the Soviet cause in their respective regions.  Soviet authorities drew 
borders designed to leave significant minority populations stranded in each republic—
division in order to rule.  As a result, by the time the Soviet Union broke up, nearly 30 
percent of the residents of Uzbekistan were not ethnic Uzbeks, while approximately 25 
percent of Tajikistan was Uzbek.52   
D. YELTSIN YEARS (1991–2000) 
Yeltsin forfeited a solid bond with the “near abroad” to pursue stronger ties with 
the west, namely the United States.  Generally, he did not want to risk the new Russian 
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Federation’s well-being on the struggling economy of Central Asia.53  His government 
did attempt to retain some influence in the region through frail alliances and multi-lateral 
agreements.  The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security 
Treaty (CST) established weak alliances with the former states of the Soviet Union. 
The new independent states of the former Soviet Union formed the CIS to ensure 
cooperation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union; however, many of its goals were 
never achieved.  Yeltsin pushed for the CIS because he, like a lot of the world, felt that 
the Central Asian states were not capable of creating independent policy and were 
susceptible to foreign governments.  The former republics rushed into the league without 
much thought of the CIS’s basic principles other than the full independence of each 
member.54  The CIS was simply an “instrument of civilized divorce” and not a binding 
organization.55  Early after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it seemed as if Russia might 
assume the hegemonic role in Central Asia through the CIS.  Russia signed a multitude of 
agreements and pacts with the individual Central Asian states, but most of them were 
never implemented.  These bilateral agreements that did become operational weakened 
the CIS by not involving the whole Commonwealth.  By the mid 1990s Central Asian 
expectations of Russian partnership dropped when the agreements and treaties weren’t 
implemented due to a weak Russian economy. In the spring of 1994, Yeltsin announced 
the opening of thirty new military bases in the CIS; however, in reality Russia gained 
very little access to any of those. 56  The “far abroad,” especially Europe and North 
America, enticed Russia’s interest and investments rather than the “near abroad” which 
didn’t seem to offer the country immediate benefits. 
Signed in Tashkent in 1992, the CST looked to be another avenue for 
strengthening Russian military influence in the region, but it only amounted to a paper 
organization.  Russia stressed the CST because it would ensure close military and 
security relations between Russia and the CIS countries.  In other words, it would ensure 
Russia’s leading role in the organization as the strongest military.  The treaty mainly 
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dealt with external threats but also outlawed the use of force against partnering countries.  
All the Central Asian states except Turkmenistan signed the treaty.  The CST never met 
its expectations because it never led to the creation of joint forces or policy.  Councils 
convened to discuss security, but most of the signatories refused to integrate militarily.  
In 1999, Uzbekistan, the strongest military force in Central Asia, withdrew from the CST 
weakening it even more.57   The attempted compromise between security requirements 
and state autonomy failed to strengthen Russia’s role in Central Asia. 
The post-Soviet regime was also concerned about what it believed to be the 
Turkish Government’s Pan-Turkic policy in Central Asia.  Concerning the convening of 
the second Turkic Summit in Istanbul in October 1994, Mikhail Demurin, spokesman of 
the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented, “It is unthinkable that a summit 
based on the principle of nationality will not disturb Russia.”58  There were a number of 
initial meetings that were viewed as aggressive as well as grassroots contacts in the 
region; however it became clear that Turkey’s influence in Central Asia was limited.  
After this realization trade between Turkey and Russia actually increased.  This increase 
in commerce caused some rifts in Central Asia, primarily with Turkmenistan.    
Yeltsin did not assert a clear policy toward Central Asia and was torn between 
strengthening relations in the near abroad or the west.  His government lacked clear 
objectives and focused on maintaining status quo.  However, the status quo didn’t fulfill 
the Central Asian’s states’ needs and they looked west for military assistance.  Joint 
training, exercises and programs like NATO’s Partnership for Peace developed in the 
1990s.   Yeltsin recognized the growth of western influence and in a 1996 speech to the 
Russian Parliament, he called, “actions by states and their alliances…to undermine 
Russia’s relations with former Soviet republics’ a threat to national security.”59  Even so 
said, Russia did not take action in the 1990s to counteract western influence in Central 
Asia.  Yeltsin wanted to stay cozy with the west to keep the potential economic progress 
that a relationship with them might provide.  Central Asia, the soft underbelly of Russia, 
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was a financial liability, but Yeltsin desired continued influence in its “backyard.”  After 
the collapse, military spending decreased and Yeltsin was distracted by conflict in 
Chechnya.  The fighting in Chechnya and Russia’s hard stance on the breakaway region 
gave rise to a new character, Vladimir Putin.  Putin’s reputation was rising at the end of 
the 1990s as Russian influence in Central Asia was waning. 
E. PUTIN YEARS (2000–PRESENT) 
In August of 1999, Yeltsin appointed Vladimir Putin as Prime Minister and he 
quickly rose to power.  He succeeded Yeltsin on December 31, 1999.  With Putin in 
control, Russia would change its attitude toward the near abroad.  Initially, Putin’s Russia 
bided its time and maintained the status quo.  However, after the September 11 attacks on 
the United States and with the growing geostrategic importance of Central Asia, Putin 
began to step up Russian military presence in the region.   
Putin added emphasis to Central Asia from the beginning.  His first trips as Prime 
Minister in 1999 were to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan where he signed new bilateral 
agreements after Uzbekistan left the CST.  In a speech to the Federation Council in 1999 
he described Uzbek-Russian relations as a “strategic partnership” and placed all the 
Central Asian countries high on the foreign policy list.60  Even though Putin visited 
Central Asia often and spoke about it to parliament, when Yeltsin stepped down and 
Putin became President, Yeltsin’s unwritten policy of no clear policy remained.  There 
were no military additions to Central Asia or any significant military pacts.  In 1999, 
when Uzbek Islamists took hostages in Kyrgyzstan, Russia offered supplies, but no 
troops to help Kyrgyzstan even though it asked for help.  In fact, Defense Minister 
Sergeev stated that Central Asian states had to play the leading role in eradicating 
terrorist groups.  Uzbekistan soldiers eliminated the terrorists since there were no Russian 
troops to help Kyrgyzstan.61  In 2000, Putin approved a national security concept very 
similar to Yeltsin’s speech of 1996 that warned foreign countries about meddling in 
Central Asia.  The concept “termed foreign efforts to ‘weaken’ Russia’s ‘position’ in 
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Central Asia a security threat.”62  The Russian liberals began to get upset at foreign 
policy for its lack of action.  Putin withdrew troops from Cuba and Vietnam, strategically 
insignificant, yet symbolic bases.  He acquiesced to the United States when it withdrew 
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in 2000.  Everything changed after 
September 11, 2001. 
Putin assigned tasks in Central Asia to a number of security and defense savvy 
officials. Putin’s representative to the CIS states is the former head of the Foreign 
Intelligence Service.  Former heads of the Federal Security Service and of the Foreign 
Intelligence Service have taken on roles in the private sector that deal mostly in Central 
Asia.63  Putin seems to be making an effort to unify and concentrate his policy toward 
Central Asia with a focus on security and border protection.  Russia considers Central 
Asia to be its southern border.  Drugs and radical Islamic movements migrating from 
Afghanistan provide significant concern for Putin and the Russian government.  Their 
goal appears to be to shore up the borders of Central Asia and to provide stability against 
the growth of radical Islamic movements.  It seems easy to deduce from these 
appointments of security officials to the region that Putin has a unified plan; however, 
there is still no evidence of a written strategy toward Central Asia. 
After September 11, 2001, the United States extended political courtesy to Russia 
in asking permission to have military presence in Central Asia.  Noting the potential 
benefits of its internal struggle with Chechnya, Russia gave its blessing to use former 
Soviet bases as launching pads for attacks in Afghanistan in support of Operation 
Enduring Freedom.  The United States established a base in Uzbekistan at Karshi-
Khanabad and another in Kyrgyzstan at Manas.  The other countries of Central Asia 
allowed over flight privileges to the United States.  This marked the first time that the 
United States had a military base in the former Soviet Union.  As the major United States 
campaign in Afghanistan slowed up, the Russians began to question why the United 
States was still in the region.  The growing United States influence in the area became 
evident to Putin and he began to take action. 
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Russia updated the CST in September 2003 with the creation of the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).  The members include Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Belarus, and Armenia.  Turkmenistan still maintains neutrality 
and Uzbekistan did not join.  The organization aims to combat terrorism and drug 
trafficking.  It also seeks to create coordinated border security and an air defense system.   
Similar to the CST and the CIS, Russia is the largest and most powerful member which 
makes it the guarantor of security in the region.  The organization allows Russia access to 
bases in all the signatory states.  The absence of Uzbekistan created a weakness in the 
organization, as they have the largest military forces in Central Asia and are the dominant 
country.  In 2004, Uzbekistan joined the organization, which will be discussed more in 
depth in Chapter IV.  
In 2003, a new defense and security doctrine appeared in Russian policy.  Sergei 
Ivanov, the Russian Defense minister and former KGB member, announced that Russia 
reserves the right to make preemptive strikes anywhere in the world, and specifically in 
Central Asia.64  Russia’s fear of extremist Muslims traveling through the porous borders 
into Central Asia and spreading to Russia prompted the new policy.  The doctrine follows 
a tenant of the 2002 Bush Doctrine of preemptive attack to stop enemy aggression before 
it happens.   Reading into this, it seems that Russia thinks of Central Asia as its southern 
border and assumes to still be the guarantor of security in Central Asia.  Russia began to 
take a more aggressive stance in Central Asia in 2002. 
Learning from Ukraine, where it threw in its lot with the ruling regime and lost, in 
Kyrgyzstan Moscow for the first time gave audience to opposition leaders well ahead of 
the riots that brought down the Akayev regime, while maintaining close ties with Mr. 
Akayev and giving him shelter in Russia after his overthrow. Mr. Putin swiftly accepted 
the change of guard in Kyrgyzstan, took the initiative in mediating to ensure smooth 
transition of power, and offered economic aid to Kyrgyzstan. The new Kyrgyz leaders in 
turn vowed to maintain close strategic ties with Russia. 
Russian authors, such as Vladimir Radyuhin, claim the United States-orchestrated 
coup in Kyrgyzstan on March 24, 2005, posed a direct threat to Russia's "soft underbelly" 
– volatile Central Asia.  The overthrow of President Askar Akayev, who ruled 
                                                   
64 Allison, “Strategic Reassertion of Russian Military Policy,” International Affairs, 280. 
37 
Kyrgyzstan for the past fifteen years, has upset a precarious balance of ethnic and clan-
based forces in Kyrgyzstan. The revolt has set on edge the big Uzbek minority in the 
south, which fears that the new nationalist Kyrgyz leadership may re-ignite ethnic tension 
in the hugely overpopulated and impoverished Fergana Valley where hundreds died in 
anti-Uzbek massacres in 1990.65  
The revolution has presented a potentially frightening scenario of Kyrgyzstan 
splitting into two states divided by the high Tian Shan Mountains if its northern and 
southern clans fail to agree on power-sharing. This would turn southern Kyrgyzstan with 
its big Uzbek, Tajik and Uighur minorities into a focal point of regional rivalries 
involving China, which shares a 1,100-km border with Kyrgyzstan, as well as Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan. The region is yet to learn to live with the arbitrary borders drawn when 
the Soviet republics were set up in the 1920s in what was Tsarist Russia's Turkestan 
province. Stalin assigned the Uzbek cities of Osh and Jalalabad to Kyrgyzstan, and 
handed over the Tajik cities of Bukhara and Samarkand to Uzbekistan. It was in Osh and 
Jalalabad that the demonstrations began.  
Any turmoil in Kyrgyzstan will benefit Islamism. In recent years southern 
Kyrgyzstan, where most people survive on $4 a month, has emerged as a hotbed of 
Islamic militancy and a "Silk Road" for drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Russia and 
Europe. It was in southern Kyrgyzstan that Osama bin Laden's close associate, Juma 
Namangani, an ethnic Uzbeki, mounted armed attacks twice—in 1999 and 2000—in an 
effort to set up base for building a Central Asian Khalifat.  
Radyuhin suggests that in order to counter United States influence Russia will 
have to do much more than engage Opposition leaders—it will have to drastically 
upgrade its informal presence in the former Soviet states.66 Russia's Ambassador to 
Bishkek complained that Moscow's ideological and political resources in Kyrgyzstan 
were limited to twelve diplomats, whereas the U.S. was represented by scores of non-
government organizations and foundations, such as the Freedom House, the National 
Democratic Institute, and the Soros Foundation. In a sign of a sweeping review of its  
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priorities in the former Soviet Union, Putin publicly admitted that the CIS failed to 
provide a mechanism for integration among former Soviet states by stating that "The CIS 
was created for civilized divorce."67  
Russia’s goals are four-fold.  First, Russia wants to secure the borders of Central 
Asia, which it practically considers its southern border.  The protection of the borders 
helps secure its next two goals which are stopping the spread of radicalism and stopping 
the flow of illegal drugs.  Its last goal appears to be counteracting foreign influence in the 
region.  The Soviets have always had a military presence in Central Asia in the form of 
bases and recruiting outposts.  The bases were manned with personnel from other parts of 
the empire, with the mindset that if civil unrest ever became a reality, the decision to fire 
on the local population would be met with much less resistance.  After the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the majority of these posts were abandoned with the most prized 
possessions (e.g., working vehicles, equipment, and furniture) being taken back to 
“mainland” Russia—except for the nuclear facilities which existed primarily in 
Kazakhstan.  Over the years, the relations were built back up again, but certainly the door 
was left ajar for other influences in the area of military presence—as long as there was 
economic string attached to it.  Noting the vacuum created by the collapse, China not 
only purchased military items from Russia for its own use, but it created an organization 
to address security in the region.  
F. SHANGHAI CORPORATION ORGANIZATION 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an intergovernmental 
organization founded in Shanghai on June 15, 2001, by six nations: China, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Its member states cover an area of 
over 30 million square kilometers, or about three fifths of Eurasia, with a population of 
1,455 billion—about a quarter of the world's total population. As the principal architect 
of the SCO, China plays a leading role in its functioning, and aids the crystallization of 
the common interests that brought the six countries together in order to form the SCO. 
The United States-led war on terror is generally deemed to be the beginning of a 
new alliance against terrorism, the fact that is overlooked in most quarters is that regional 
cooperation such as the SCO had proclaimed their union against terror well before the al-
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Qaeda-led attack on the United States. Indeed, such multilateral collaboration against 
terrorism cannot be said to be the result of the events of September 11, 2001—in all 
probability, it was perhaps mooted much earlier, in order to keep the United States from 
decisively entering the region. Led by the Peoples' Republic of China, the SCO has been 
able to ably address not only the question of terrorism, but has hammered out a coalition 
of states that have common security and economic concerns. However, criticism about 
the effectiveness of the SCO has been voiced in certain quarters because of the non-
inclusion of important nations such as India in the coalition. Such criticism gains in 
degree when one considers the fact that India is a country that has been a victim of cross-
border terror for a relatively longer period than most of the present SCO members. 
Moreover, the reported Sino-Russian concern that it would be difficult to keep Pakistan 
out of the SCO were India to be admitted meets skepticism because of the recognized 
sponsorship of not only anti India terror provided by Pakistan, but also because of the 
Islamic Republic's emergence as a fountainhead of Islamist terror in the region. 
The earlier incarnation of the SCO was the Shanghai Five, a mechanism that 
originated and grew as a result of an endeavor by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, 
and Tajikistan. The primary goal of the apparatus was to strengthen confidence building 
and disarmament in the border regions. In 1996 and 1997, the heads of state of the five 
aforementioned nations met in Shanghai and Moscow respectively and signed the "Treaty 
on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions and the Treaty on Reduction of Military 
Forces in Border Regions". Thereafter, the annual meetings became a customary practice 
and were held alternately in the five member states. The issues that were raised and 
discussed in the meeting gradually extended from building up trust in the border regions 
to mutually beneficial cooperation from building up trust in the border regions to 
mutually beneficial cooperation in the arena of politics, security, diplomacy, economics, 
trade, and other such areas.  
On the fifth anniversary of the Shanghai Five, on June 15, 2001, the heads of state 
of its members and the President of Uzbekistan met in Shanghai, the place of birth of the 
mechanism. The convening heads of state signed a declaration admitting Uzbekistan as 
the sixth member of the Shanghai Five apparatus and jointly issued a "Declaration on the 
establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization". The document announced that 
40 
for the purpose of upgrading the level of cooperation more effectively, to seize 
opportunities, and to deal with new challenges and threats, the six nations had decided to 
establish the SCO on the basis of the Shanghai Five mechanism. 
In June 2002, the heads of SCO member states met in St. Petersburg, Russia, and 
signed the "SCO Charter," which clearly expounded the purposes and principles of the 
mechanism, its organizational structure, form of operation, cooperation orientation, and 
external relations, marking a tangible institution of this new organization within the limits 
of international law.  According to the "SCO Charter" and the "Declaration on 
establishment of the SCO," the main purposes of SCO are: 
• Strengthening mutual trust and good-neighborliness and friendship among 
member states. 
• Developing their effective cooperation in political affairs, economy and 
trade, science and technology, culture, education, energy, transportation, 
environmental protection, and other fields. 
• Working together to maintain regional peace, security, and stability, and 
• Promoting the creation of a new international political and economic order 
featuring democracy, justice, and rationality. 68 
 
The SCO also abides by the following basic principles: 
• Adherence to the purposes and principles of the "Charter of United 
Nations." 
•  Respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, and territorial 
integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, mutual non-use 
or threat of use of force. 
• Equality among all member states. 
• Settlement of all questions through consultations. 
• Non-alignment and no directing against any other country or organization, 
and 
• Opening to the outside world and willingness to carry all forms of 
dialogues, exchanges, and cooperation with other countries and relevant 
international or regional organizations.69 
 
The SCO stands for and acts on a new security concept secured on mutual trust, 
disarmament, and cooperative security; a new state-to-state relationship with partnership 
instead of alignment at its core, and a new model of regional cooperation featuring 
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concerted effort by countries of all sizes, and mutually beneficial cooperation. In the 
course of development, a "Shanghai spirit" gradually took shape, a spirit characterized by 
mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, cooperation, respect for diversity, and common 
development.70  It is important to understand what the tenets of the SCO are because as 
will be seen in Chapters IV and V, the statements issued by this group begin to carry 
more weight as the years pass, and especially in the case of Uzbekistan.  
G. CONCLUSION 
Soviet interest in Central Asia was primarily restricted to natural resources and 
manpower pools.  While the interest in natural resources may be the same for the current 
Russian administration, there is a significant interest in regional security.  This concern 
about security has brought about increased pressure on the United States in the form of 
directives from the SCO, as well as a vested interest in strengthening military presence in 
these countries.  The next chapter will outline Soviet and Russian military presence in 
Central Asia and the significance it holds for United States interests in the same region.  
                                                   
































IV. SOVIET/RUSSIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN 
CENTRAL ASIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The lack of geographical boundaries with Russia was just the beginning of 
boundary issues with its northern neighbor.  Once the Great Game was complete, Central 
Asia was firmly in the control of Russia and ultimately the Soviet Union following the 
1917 Bolshevik Revolution.  In order to create a buffer zone in the south, Stalin set about 
creating artificial republics in Central Asia.  Created by a series of decrees from 1924-36, 
artificial boundaries were created for the five countries that did not reflect historical 
realities, ethnic groups or languages.  The republics were not supposed to be viable 
independent entities.  As Stalin was establishing in Eastern Europe, Soviet nationalities 
policies were aimed at breaking existing nationalities, or the fusion of people into a homo 
sovieticus.  This Soviet social engineering was to be accomplished through declaring 
Russian the official language; breaking up large linguistic and cultural groups (e.g. 
Turkic) and religion (e.g. Islam); transforming minorities into majorities and vice-versa. 
For many years following World War II and even after Stalin’s death, the decision 
to publish Soviet strategy was not a primary concern.  Eventually however, the 
relationship between policy and military strategy was analyzed in a book entitled Military 
Strategy written by a team of authors appointed by Krushchev.  This book was published 
in three editions, 1962, 1963, and 1968.  With a primary goal of causing concern in the 
West, this book did not provide in-depth analysis of policy or doctrine.  It included 
statements such as: 
The recognition of war as a means of policy defines the relationship 
between military strategy and policy which is based on the principle of 
complete subordination of the former to the latter…[and] the goals and 
tasks of strategy are defined by and directly stem from the aims and goals 
of state policy, of which military strategy is one means.71 
The Soviet engineered “top-down” approach to building a state would have 
serious implications in the future of Central Asia.  The Soviet system of institutions, 
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administrations, and ideologies were forced onto an area where it was previously 
unknown.  Ironically, milli, the Turkic word for “national,” referred to a religious and 




Uzbekistan has been more influenced by the west than Russia in the recent past, 
but that is changing rapidly.  It is the Central Asian state that Russia has tried to influence 
the most militarily.  Uzbeks are the most populous race in the region and the country is 
the most powerful force among the Central Asian states.  Russia overlooks Uzbekistan’s 
awful human rights record and appreciates the state’s hard line actions on radical 
Islamists.  Uzbekistan’s reentry into the CSTO and new agreements with Russia show 
Russia’s growing military influence in Central Asia. Uzbekistan will be a key ally to 
Russia.   
Uzbekistan’s pull-out of the CST showed Russia’s forfeiture of influence in the 
1990’s.  Uzbekistan sought military aid and benefits from the west as Russia showed no 
clear strategy or willingness to help.  After it left the CST, Uzbekistan joined GUUAM, 
an alliance between Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova.  GUUAM 
members lean toward the west and actively participate with NATO and the Partnership 
for Peace program.72  Russia attempted to keep Uzbekistan close and included them in a 
military exercise with the members of the CSTO.  CIS Southern Shield 1999, in late fall 
1999, was a command and staff exercise based on the Islamic incursion into Kyrgyzstan 
earlier that year.  CIS Southern Shield 2000, another exercise, put troops from all the 
CSTO states plus Uzbekistan in joint combat training for the first time.73  When Russia 
lost Uzbekistan’s partnership in the CSTO, they seemed to step up influence with the 
country. 
After September 11, Uzbekistan allowed the United States to use Karshi-
Khanabad air base for operations in Afghanistan.  Russia allied itself with America in the 
global war on terror, but couldn’t have been very content with the United States’ growing 
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influence.  Uzbekistan was involved with NATO and the Partnership for Peace and 
received military aid from the United States.  Recently, Uzbekistan has switched allies 
and has began to side with Russia.  
Russia has won back Uzbekistan’s interest and their partnership is growing.  
Uzbekistan fears Islamic insurgents as much as Russia and fears the growing calls from 
the United States for democratic revolution.  Uzbekistan’s President Karimov called for 
the United States to leave the base at Karshi-Khanabad by January 2006; the United 
States finished operations and moved out the last week of November 2005.  In 
September, Russia and Uzbekistan held joint military exercises.  The Russian 76th 
Airborne and several Special Forces groups participated along with equal numbers of 
Uzbek troops.  On November 14, 2005, Karimov and Putin signed a military treaty at the 
Kremlin that calls for each country to provide military aid to the other in the event of 
aggression. 
With the United States departure from Uzbekistan, Russia has the opportunity to 
move its own forces in.  Russia will take over the airbase at Karshi-Khanabad within the 
next year as soon as Uzbekistan is officially a member of the CSTO.74  However, General 
Yuri Baluyevsky, the Russian chief of the General Staff, said “Russia sees no need to 
deploy troops to Uzbekistan, even though an alliance treaty signed last month allows 
that.”  He also stated that Russia reserves the right to defend its interests in the former 
Soviet sphere of influence.75   Only the future can tell what Russia will do, but it seems 
that Russia will take Karshi-Khanabad with its expanding military role in Central Asia. 
C. KYRGYZSTAN 
In 2003, Russia signed a 15 year lease and established an airbase at Kant, 30 
kilometers from the United States airbase at Manas.  Russia’s first foreign military base 
to be established since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Kant seems to be a deliberate 
attempt to detract the United State’s growing influence.  The lease of Kant along with the 
growing number of military exercises in Kyrgyzstan suggests Russia’s military influence 
is increasing. 
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Russia began to add training operations in Kyrgyzstan in 2002.  South Anti-terror 
2002 was a series of operational-tactical exercises that took place in Kyrgyzstan in April 
2002.  The regional Antiterrorist Center based in Bishkek was involved in the exercises, 
as well as ground forces, combat aircraft and air defense systems.76  The exercises build 
interdependence on each other for security.  In 2003, Russia found another avenue of 
military influence in Kyrgyzstan. 
Russia used Kant in the 1990’s until contentions arose about Kyrgyzstan’s debt to 
Russia.  Kyrgyzstan wanted to charge Russia rent for use of the base, but Russia only 
wanted to provide military training in exchange.  In late 2002, Russian Frontal Aviation 
and Military Transport planes deployed to Kant in support of the Collective Rapid 
Deployment Force of the CSTO.77  Soon afterwards, in October 2003, Russia officially 
opened the base at Kant.  President Putin claimed that the former President of 
Kyrgyzstan, Akeav, initiated the idea, but there are no sources to confirm this.  Russia 
has spent 3.3 million dollars in reconstruction, and will spend another 10 million dollars 
to modernize it.78   The base currently maintains five SU-27’s, five SU-25’s, seven Il-76 
and An-26’s, five L-39’s and two Mi-8 helicopters, and around 900 troops in a land 
component.79   In 2004, Russia used its new base to launch joint exercises with the 
members of the CSTO.  Frontier 2004 included over 2000 troops from Russia and the 
Central Asian members of the organization. Russian aircraft, both jets and helicopters, 
struck targets with live munitions in Kyrgyzstan for the first time.80 In March, Russia 
announced that it planned to increase the number of aircraft and the capability of Kant.  
They plan to enlarge the runway, modernize equipment and increase the number of 
combat aircraft, according to Russia’s 5th Air and Air Defense Commander.81 
Russia may be looking to expand its presence in Kyrgyzstan.  The new President 
of Kyrgyzstan, Kurmanbek Saliyevich Bakiyev, has suggested that Russia establish a 
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base in the Osh region.  However, in November, the Kyrgyzstan defense minister stated 
that Russia has no intention of moving into the Osh region.  He also mentioned that the 
Russian base in Kant is a powerful stabilizer in the region.82  Although Russia is 
expanding militarily in the region, it would be surprising to see them establish operations 
in Osh.  They already have Kant in Kyrgyzstan, and it would make more sense for Russia 
to establish operations in Uzbekistan where the United States left behind a useful 
infrastructure. 
D. BORDER DISPUTES 
The ongoing squabbles over unresolved border issues constitute another factor 
contributing to the instability in the region. This problem directly emanates directly from 
Stalin’s decision to re-draw the borders of the Central Asian republics in the 1920s. The 
borders were drawn with no apparent rhyme or reason other than the Soviet leader’s 
attempts to keep these republics in constant turmoil and dependent on Moscow for 
security and stability.  
The majority of the border issues are centered in the Ferghana Valley region of 
Central Asia. This region is considered the heart of Central Asia because it is where the 
majority of the population is located. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan share 
common borders within this region. The borders between these three nations in the 
Ferghana Valley are complex and bewildering. The Soviet re-drawing of the borders left 
thousands of people of various ethnic minorities stranded in enclaves in each of the three 
nations.  
Two examples are the problematic Sukh and Vorukh enclaves in Kyrgyzstan. 
“The Sukh Enclave, with a population of 43,000 people and an area the size of the Gaza 
Strip, is part of Uzbekistan, stranded in and surrounded on all sides by Kyrgyzstan…The 
enclave is predominantly populated by Tajiks.”83 The Vorukh enclave, also within 
Kyrgyzstan, is actually part of the territory of Tajikistan, with the majority of the 
population consisting of Tajiks.  
The difficulties which these borders create have only been exacerbated by the 
governments of these Central Asian states. Strict border policies (and, in the case of 
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Uzbekistan, mining of the border areas) continue to create tension among the three states. 
Uzbekistan mined its borders with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in an attempt to stop IMU 
incursions.  
The strict border regulations have taken their toll on the poverty-stricken 
population. “The new borders have divided villages, farms, and families. For farmers to 
visit their relatives in the next village across the border, they now need a passport that 
costs the equivalent of a hundred dollars and a visa costing ten.”84 
Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in Kyrgyzstan on October 22, 2003 to 
attend the official opening of a Russian air base in Kant, near the capital, Bishkek. The 
new Russian air base is in a country that is already hosting other military visitors –- part 
of the U.S.-led antiterrorism coalition engaged in Afghanistan. Kyrgyz Defense Minister 
Esen Topoev has ensured that Russia's air base will have a "sobering effect" on terrorist 
groups planning to destabilize the region. The agreement will be in force for at least 15 
years, but may then be extended by five-year terms. More than 500 military and civilian 
personnel and about 20 aircraft—including attack planes, fighter planes, transport planes, 
and helicopters—will be based in Kant. Four trainer planes will also be transferred from 
Kyrgyzstan's armed forces. 
E. AFGHANISTAN 
The underlying reason for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is summed up in 
what became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine which stated, “once a communist state 
always a communist state”, which in essence means that the Soviet Union possessed the 
right and duty to intervene in neighboring countries if and when an existing socialist 
regime was threatened.  In April 1978, the Soviets helped establish Nur M. Taraki and his 
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) as the ruling regime.  In 1979, there were a 
number of trips by Soviet leadership to ascertain the stability of this new regime, but by 
September, Taraki had been assassinated and the Soviet Politburo decided to put the 
Brezhnev Doctrine to the test.  The strategy in Afghanistan centered around the following 
political and military objectives:  1) transforming the People’s Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan into an effective and legitimate ruling party 2) winning the population’s  
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support or at least to have subdued acceptance of the regime 3) building up the armed 
forces of the DRA to make it capable of defending the regime and 4) eliminating the 
resistance. 85   
Military failure is often the result of a flawed strategy and in the case of the 
Soviet-Afghan War, the Soviet strategy was flawed “in terms of ends, ways, and means, 
including execution.”86  Although the Soviet strategy in Afghanistan proved to be flawed 
after the engagement began, it did have a thought out plan with specific objectives for its 
military leaders to reach for.  Chechnya however, is a classic case of exacting revenge 
without clear-cut objectives.  Removing bandits from the mountains of Chechnya is a 
police responsibility and the lack of a clear objective also means that it will be very hard 
to determine when the fighting will end. 
Soviet operations in Afghanistan can be divided up into four phases: invasion and 
initial occupation, occupation, counterinsurgency, and turning point.  Four months after a 
general staff team visited Afghanistan, another team consisting of over 50 officers from 
the Soviet Ground Forces made a similar visit.  In September 1979, several divisions in 
the Central Asian military district began to mobilize, followed in October with similar 
movements in Turkestan.  Repositioning of aircraft and logistical stockpiles were moved 
to the Soviet border.  These were all in preparation for phase one.  Phase two, which 
began in January 1980, included 50,000 personnel that were a part of the Limited 
Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (LCSFA).  The LCSFA’s primary 
responsibility was to provide a base of stability so that the DRA Armed Force could go 
out and capture and/or neutralize insurgents, ensuring that the Soviet forces would have 
minimal contact with the local population.  Ultimately the plan was for the LCSFA to be 
withdrawn within two years time.   
After three years of war, however, the LCSFA had made little progress toward 
achieving its objectives, the DRA Armed Forces continued to be ill-trained and non-
trustworthy.  Meanwhile the Mujahideen increased in strength, numbers and amount of 
territory controlled.  Based on these facts and the unwillingness to send in the more than 
500,000 troops it would take to achieve its objectives, phase three turned to 
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counterinsurgency methods to include replacing leadership, establishing Soviet schools 
for the population, undermine the religious leaders, and most damaging—destroying 
agricultural necessities.  Having failed to crush the insurgents by 1987, the Soviet High 
Command realized that victory was out of reach, and in 1988 Gorbachev’s regime began 
the withdrawal process.         
The Mujahideen had a different perspective, but also divided the war into four 
phases.  Their first phase was the initial nationwide resistance to the invading Soviets and 
Afghan communists.  Their second phase was a reorganization phase in which the 
Mujahideen structured their headquarters, organized for the receipt and distribution of 
arms and material, and began training their forces for the prolonged war to drive the 
Soviets out.  Their third phase was surviving the more technologically advanced Soviet 
military.  Phase four was also the turning point for the Mujahideen who increased attacks 
to speed up the withdrawal of the Soviets.87 
By 1994, the Mujahideen had been replaced by the Chechens as the target of 
military operations.  In November 1994, the bulk of the operations in Chechnya were 
clandestine using special Soviet forces to stir unrest, even attempt to take out elements of 
Dudayev’s regime.88  By December, the clandestine operations were abandoned and the 
military openly sought to unseat Dudayev.  The result, however, was a long series of 
military operations bungled by the Russians and stymied by the traditionally rugged 
guerrilla forces of the Chechen separatists.  The initial Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
was a great tactical success.  On December 24, 1979 they conducted an air-landing 
assault at Kabul and Bagram airports to link up with pre-existing forces that were put in 
place covertly.  Within days a special strike force had killed President Amin.  In addition, 
five Soviet motorized rifle divisions (MRDs) with air support advanced from the north 
and soundly defeated the remaining DRA troops.  This was a fine example of great 
military execution.  Unfortunately, the conventional belief that taking the capital and 
killing the leader signaled victory would haunt the Soviet forces for many years and lives 
to come.  
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Once the counterinsurgency phase was enacted, the tactics for carrying out the 
operation went from bad to worse.  In an effort to wage economic warfare, the Soviets 
used whatever they could to destroy agriculture and villages that were thought to be 
sympathetic to the Mujahideen.   
Bombers, artillery, rockets, anti-personnel mines and chemical munitions 
were all used to bombard villages, destroy agricultural infrastructure, burn 
crops, contaminate food stocks and water, and kill livestock.89    
The decision to allow these gangster tactics were beyond the scope of what the 
military exists for and it only served to strengthen the resolve of the opposition and the 
hatred against the occupiers.  The unfair tactics and senseless killings also opened the 
door for the British and United States to engage via supplying anti-aircraft weaponry.  
This support greatly shifted the balance in favor of the Mujahideen.   
F. CONCLUSION 
Despite the events in the early 1990s, including the Tajik civil war and the 
incident in the Namangan province of Uzbekistan, radical Islam was not considered a 
major problem in Central Asia until 1996 when the Taliban came to power in 
Afghanistan. The Taliban victory in Afghanistan ensured a secure place for the training, 
coordination and economic backing of radical Islamic groups throughout the world, 
including the Islamic Movement Uzbekistan (IMU). Although the rise of the Taliban 
united the Central Asian governments in cooperation to fight militant Islam, it was not 
until 1999 that “a shift took place from only talking about regional cooperation to taking 
real measures against Islamists.”90  
Two events in 1999 caused the shift: the attempted assassination of Uzbek 
President Islam Karimov in a series of car bombings in Tashkent in February and the 
incursion by Islamists into the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan in August. The incursions 
resulted in the kidnapping of several hostages. These two events illustrated the extreme 
threat posed by radical Islamic groups which now confronted the governments of the 
Central Asian states.  
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Since the U.S.-led war against the Taliban regime and the Al Qaeda terrorist 
network in Afghanistan began in October 2001, the threat posed by the IMU in Central 
Asia has significantly decreased but has not disappeared. A large number of IMU fighters 
were either killed or scattered while fighting alongside Taliban and al Qaeda fighters in 
Afghanistan. According to the State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, the 
military leader of the IMU, Juma Namangani, was killed during an air strike at the battle 
of Kondoz in November 2001.91 
Members of the Russian Duma and Russian military officials have been the most 
out spoken critics of United States policy in the Central Asian region. They contend that 
the presence of the United States and NATO in Central Asia is an attempt to force Russia 
out of the region, gain control of the region’s energy resources, and force a wedge 
between Russia and China in the SCO. In January 2002 the Speaker of Russia’s lower 
house of parliament, the Duma, Gennadii Seleznev, voiced his opposition to the presence 
of United States forces in the region. During his visit to Tajikistan, Seleznev stated that 
“The long-term military presence of the United States in the region is not in Russia’s 
interests.”114 In February 2002 the Director of the Russian Federal Border Guard 
Service, Konstantine Totskiy, also commented on the establishment of United States 
bases in the Central Asian region. “If the United States and other countries intend to stay 
here [i.e., in Central Asia] for good, we cannot agree to that.”92  
Despite the views of some leaders of the Russian Duma and Russian military, 
Putin evidently understands that if Russia is to grow into a “superpower” once again, 
Russia must cooperate with the West and with the United States in particular.  Putin’s 
government also views the presence of NATO and United States forces in the Central 
Asian region as an added measure of security and stability that will allow him more time 
to re-build Russia’s deteriorating military.  Putin’s foreign minister, Igor Ivanov, 
expressed this positive view of United States and NATO forces in the region during his  
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interview with the Russian newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta in December 2002. When 
questioned about U.S.-Russia relations, Ivanov spoke about the positive factor of United 
States forces in the Central Asian region: 
We had constantly been indicating that the threat to our interests, a real 
threat at that, was coming from the south, primarily from the territory of 
Afghanistan. It is clear that Russia could hardly have tackled the task of 
eliminating the seat of terrorism in Afghanistan on its own, single-
handedly. It had been accomplished by the efforts of the international 
coalition. Have our southern borders become more secure as a result? 
Absolutely…Yes, we have to make compromises, one of them has been 
the appearance in this region of U.S., and not only U.S., servicemen who 
are solving the task connected with the international operation in 
Afghanistan.93  
Russia recently has begun to counteract United States presence in the area.  The 
new base at Kant, Kyrgyzstan is only 20 kilometers from the United States airbase at 
Manas.   Russia maintains membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 
a partnership with China and all of the Central Asian states except Turkmenistan.  In the 
summer of 2005, the SCO expressed its displeasure with United States military bases in 
Central Asia.  This coupled with the incident at Andijon, Uzbekistan forced the United 
States to commit to leaving Uzbekistan within six months.  Uzbekistan’s unfriendly 
action toward the United States was surely backed by Russia and spurred by Uzbekistan’s 
disgruntlement with the United States’ new disdain with Uzbekistan’s poor human rights 
record.  In particular relations became severely strained over Uzbek troops' suppression 
of an uprising in May in the city of Andijan. In July, the Uzbek government gave United 
States forces six months to leave. Some argue that without the backing of Russia, and the 
possibility of new military accords, Uzbekistan never would have forced the United 
States out.  Russia is attempting to reestablish itself as the main military influence, and is 
experiencing success.   
On November 14, 2005, the presidents of Russia and Uzbekistan signed a military 
treaty forging an alliance that reasserts Moscow's influence in the former Soviet republic.  
The deal, which could foreshadow the establishment of a Russian military base there, 
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allows each country the use of military installations on the other's territory. The 
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V. UNITED STATES MILITARY PRESENCE IN CENTRAL 
ASIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The attack on United States soil rallied public support for decisive military action 
even stronger than the first Gulf War.  As suspects were named and ties to Al Qaeda were 
verified, that decisive military action was just a matter of time.  As with all military 
actions there are contingency plans to help guide the forces in obtaining objectives.  
President Bush told the country that terrorists would be pursued and brought to justice no 
matter where they were or no matter how long it would take.  This open-ended 
declaration will be important in examining the military presence situation.  Part of a 
successful operation is being able to supply and sustain forces to carry out the mission in 
the field.  As plans became reality a new partnership arose in the form of agreements 
between the United States and many of the Central Asian countries.  The objective of this 
chapter is to discuss the negotiations and permissions needed to secure United States 
military presence in Central Asia—from the bandwaggoning war on terror to the inward 
look of each regime for sustained relationships. 
Since September 11, 2001, the United States has fought two wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. In these wars, the United States has sustained forces in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus over an extended period by sea and air for the first time in history. Thus, 
American leaders and commanders revealed that United States forces would and could be 
optimized for global power projection capabilities, and that new theaters like Central 
Asia were of considerable strategic importance to Washington. Their actions reflected the 
importance of that area as a potential theater of strategic operations.   
The challenge is that these zones are epicenters of domestic instability and great 
power rivalry. Moreover, the United States concept of foreign access is changing 
dramatically due to the new Global Posture Review.  Therefore, our future access to these 
areas will not resemble that of the past with sprawling bases, but will remain relatively 
austere pending future contingencies. To secure and maintain that access, it is not enough 
to have a purely contractual military relationship with these states when a crisis arises. 
Instead, we need a holistic and strategically conceived program of interaction with them 
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to help them ward off challenges to domestic security and threats from nearby great 
powers who would like to subordinate these new and fragile states to their own quasi-
imperial designs. Thus the United States has to help strengthen our partners not only 
against terrorism, but also against threats that could lead to it if state order breaks down. 
In other words, our presence must become one that is regarded by local governments as 
not being a purely contractual or one-shot deal, but rather as having a legitimacy acquired 
by an overall improvement of domestic and foreign security. 
Since the United States cannot count on direct unmediated access to battlefields, 
even in less distant and remote regions than Afghanistan, it must pioneer in creating new 
joint, expeditionary fighting organizations that can project power to distant theaters and 
gain access to them in peacetime and wartime.95  And, if possible, it must urgently find a 
basis for operating in new areas as well.  As Robert Harkavy has written, planners can no 
longer count on anything close to such access. A large portion of the troops and aircraft 
once in Europe have since returned to the continental United States. Access to, and transit 
rights over, such states as Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, and even Saudi Arabia are 
problematic, depending much more than before on the nature of the crisis, despite a much 
larger “permanent” presence in several of the Gulf Cooperation Council states. Even 
Europe could be in question if the political divide between the United States and the 
European Union over Middle Eastern policies should widen. Hence, worst-case scenarios 
have envisioned the United States in a tough situation, attempting to intervene in the Gulf 
area mostly from bases in the continental United States and from carrier battle groups and 
amphibious formations.96 
Thus the importance of theaters like Central Asia, United States strategic access 
to them, and the need for joint war fighting and power projection entities are linked and 
increasingly important, if not vital issues. But that linkage also mandates working with 
partners and allies to create enduring coalitions enabling us and them to achieve common 
strategic goals.97 
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Following the September 11 attacks on the United States, it took planners nearly 
three weeks to forge alliances, prepare plans against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and put in 
place the over flight, basing, and special-access agreements essential for Operation 
Enduring Freedom.  In the new era of combating terrorism and terrorist, three weekends 
could literally be an eternity for this new threat. Ramstein Air Base, Germany served as 
the principal strategic hub for all airlift operations supporting Operation Enduring 
Freedom. Armenia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, 
and Pakistan granted over flight privileges. 
B. UZBEKISTAN  
In preparation for the war in Afghanistan, USCENTCOM and the USAF 
completed site surveys of many Central Asian airfields, entered agreements with three of 
the countries, and negotiated limited use of airfields in the other two.98 Uzbekistan was 
the first country to offer access rights to United States military forces for operations in 
Afghanistan. It offered Khanabad for all but offensive combat operations, serving as a 
logistics hub in support of ground forces in Afghanistan, search and rescue operations, 
and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) launch and recovery. In exchange for use of 
airfields, the United States signed an agreement with Uzbekistan on 12 March 2002 for 
future cooperation and security arrangements.99  A secret agreement was reached with 
Uzbekistan to move United States troops into the country to secure bases to airlift 
supplies to the Northern Alliance. 
The United States recognized the independence of Uzbekistan on December 25, 
1991, and opened an embassy in Tashkent in March 1992.   The United States believes 
that its own interests will best be served by the development of an independent, stable, 
prosperous, and democratic Central Asia. As the most populous country in Central Asia 
and the geographic and strategic center of Central Asia, Uzbekistan plays a pivotal role in 
the region. The United States accordingly has developed a broad relationship covering 
political, military, nonproliferation, economic, trade, assistance, and related issues. This 
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has been institutionalized through the establishment of the U.S.-Uzbekistan Joint 
Commission, which held its first meeting in February 1998.  
The United States has consulted closely with Uzbekistan on regional security 
problems, and Uzbekistan has been a close ally of the United States at the United 
Nations. Uzbekistan has been a strong partner of the United States on foreign policy and 
security issues ranging from Iraq to Cuba, nuclear proliferation to narcotics trafficking. It 
has sought active participation in Western security initiatives under the Partnership for 
Peace, OSCE, and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Uzbekistan views its American 
ties as balancing regional influences, helping Uzbekistan assert its own regional role, and 
encouraging foreign investment. Uzbekistan was an ardent supporter of United States 
military actions in Afghanistan and of the war against terror overall. 
The Karimov regime had begun rethinking the notion that friendship with the 
United States could make good relations with Russia unnecessary.  In the 
meantime, the Uzbek regime did not appear to have become less repressive, and popular 
disaffection in the country also seemed to be on the rise, driven not just by the limited 
capacity for political expression but increasingly by the economic hardships caused by 
border closings. Prices rose, and corrupt officials continued to take their share of 
proceeds. Protests grew, including in rural farming areas.100 Such a situation is 
particularly worrisome in a repressive environment where there are few mechanisms for 
nonviolent resolution of conflict. In such cases it becomes increasingly likely that the 
government will respond with violence to any unrest that does occur. 
In May 2005 in Uzbekistan’s Andijan province, there was a jailbreak, followed by 
a public political demonstration, which resulted in bloodshed. On the night of May 12–
13, a number of prisoners, many of them reportedly held on charges of Islamic radical 
activism (which they denied) were freed from the local jail by a group of armed men. The 
armed men took hostages, and, according to Uzbek officials, killed at least some of them. 
They seized the main municipal building and attempted to capture the national security 
service headquarters, but failed in the attempt. They then led a street protest in the square 
in front of the seized municipal building. Local residents joined in complaint against 
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Andijan and Uzbek authorities. Security forces fired into the growing crowd, which 
included both the armed men who carried out the jailbreak and unarmed civilians. 
Authorities eventually blocked off and stormed the square, according to 
eyewitness reports. Uzbek officials report that 187 people died, including Uzbek security 
personnel. Some human rights groups have cited much higher numbers of dead, in the 
thousands.101 
The Andijan events heightened Uzbek tension with the United States. Tashkent 
refused an independent international investigation into the incident, although it did invite 
the United States and the UK to send representatives to a commission it was forming. 
Both countries declined. Russia, on the other hand, expressed support for Uzbekistan, as 
did China, which Uzbek President Islam Karimov visited on the heels of the crisis. 
In late July 2005, Uzbekistan formally terminated an agreement allowing the 
United States to use the Karshi-Kanabad (K2) Airbase in support of its military 
operations in Afghanistan. The Armed Forces Press Service reported that the United 
States had been given 180 days to vacate the facility which it had used since October 
2001 and reportedly housed approximately 800 personnel.102 The termination of the 
agreement followed criticism increased restrictions on the use of the base by the Uzbek 
government as well as rising tensions between the two countries, specifically criticism 
from the United States and its calls for an independent inquiry into the May 2005 clashes 
between Uzbek security forces and civilians in the city of Andijan. 
On August 26, 2005, Uzbekistan's Senate approved the Uzbek government's order 
calling for the withdrawal of United States military forces from the country and the 
Karshi-Kanabad Airbase. Additionally, some senators demanded compensation for 
environmental damages caused by the United States at the facility. 
C. KYRGYZSTAN 
In December 2001, America signed a one-year lease/access agreement with 
Kyrgyzstan for use of the Manas International Airport near the capital of Bishkek. The 
United States military built a 37-acre base extension to the airport with an administration 
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headquarters, housing, warehouses, munitions bunkers, fuel tanks, etc. It was clearly the 
best operational base that United States forces had for direct access into the region. This 
facility supported a variety of missions and was a strategic logistics, refueling, and 
operational hub for air forces supporting operations over Afghanistan. It was used to 
transport troops and cargo to bases in the Afghan cities of Kandahar, Bagram, and Mazar-
i-Sharif; stage tactical fighter operations over Afghanistan; and launch unmanned UAVs. 
Unlike the agreements with other nations, the agreement with Kyrgyzstan did not limit 
the type of aircraft or missions that allies could perform from Manas. Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan both provided critical over flight rights and limited access to their airfields. 
It cannot be overemphasized that these countries provided critical staging bases on the 
perimeter of 
Kyrgyzstan favors close relations with the United States and would like to deepen 
bilateral relations. Kyrgyzstan has advanced quickly in the area of democratic reform; 
however, recent setbacks in democratization have caused serious concern IIN the United 
States and make it difficult to expand relations to areas outside of security and the 
economy. The United States is disturbed by the deregistration of political parties, the 
pursuit of criminal charges, and the arrests of political figures by the Kyrgyz Government 
in order to pressure opposition. Because of the threat posed by insurgents and their ties to 
foreign terrorist organizations, security remains a top concern of the United States. The 
United States Government provides humanitarian assistance, non-lethal military 
assistance, and assistance to support economic and political reforms. It also has supported 
Kyrgyzstan's requests for assistance from international organizations. The United States 
helped Kyrgyzstan accede to the WTO in December 1998, and United States assistance 
has aided Kyrgyzstan to implement necessary economic reforms, support the Ferghana 
Valley, and fund important health programs.  
Manas, the international airport at Bishkek (named after the mythical national 
hero), was modernized in 1988 to make it the most modern commercial airport in Central 
Asia.  Manas has a 13,800-foot long runway, built for Soviet bombers. There is room for 
four C-17 or C-5 cargo planes to park along the taxiway. The base lies about 1,500 
kilometers from Kandahar, a three-hour flight.  
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The facility covers 37 acres. It is fenced off by a concrete wall at the top of which 
coiled razor wire has been placed. Four watchtowers overlook the facility which holds 
roughly 300 tents, a fitness room, a chapel, a post office, a recreation room as well as a 
$5 million, 60-bed military hospital which opened in April 2002, and is manned by South 
Korean troops. 
The facility was unofficially renamed Ganci Air Base, after Chief Peter J. Ganci 
Jr., chief of the New York City Fire Department who gave his life Sept. 11 during the 
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. Although the United States Air Force is 
renowned for providing for the comfort of its troops, American airmen here say Ganci is 
setting a new standard for comfortable deployments downrange. 
The Air Force's 376th Air Expeditionary Wing was been tasked with operating 
the facility which also houses troops from South Korea, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Australia, Norway and Spain. The 786th Security Forces Squadron is part of the 86th 
Contingency Response Group from Ramstein Air Base, Germany, and its mission is to 
ensure the safety of coalition forces setting up the Manas airfield. As of June 2002, the 
822nd Security Forces out of Moody Air Force Base in Valdosta, GA, was also deployed 
at Manas. 
On February 15, 2006, the Russian newspaper Kommersant reported that 
Kyrgyzstan would be charging the United States $207 million in rent for the use of the 
base; an increase from the $2 million that the United States was being charged yearly 
until January 2006 when new terms for the use of the base were given. 
Further searching of global sources revealed that the Kyrgyz government would 
receive $7,000 for each landing and take-off and that the one year agreement had an 
option for extension.  One of the most telling articles was written and published in 
Kyrgyzstan.  In March 2002, the title of the article suggested that the Taliban was a 
“convenient reason” for the United States to enter Central Asia and it expressed concern 
that the United States was simply “establishing a unitary order based on American 
values.”103  The extension was agreed to in April 2002, and by 2003 over $150 million 
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had been invested.  This report will be completed in May 2005, and Manas Air Base has 
over 3,000 personnel and permanent structures in-place.104 
D. AFGHANISTAN 
While peacekeeping efforts are ongoing, the United States and its allies were able 
to destroy Taliban forces and remove the enemy from power in Afghanistan in a mere 49 
days. This is significant because the original military estimate for success was thought to 
be six months. This remarkable feat was achievable only when the United States rallied a 
coalition of nations to fight the Taliban in less than three weeks after the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attack in the United States.  Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan 
demonstrated that it is difficult to rapidly deploy forces into a distant theater without 
standing operations orders, assured access to regional airfields/airspace, and the 
supporting infrastructure. 
Ramstein Air Base, Germany served as the principal strategic hub for all airlift 
operations supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. Armenia, Bulgaria, Turkey, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan granted over flight 
privileges. Bulgaria also allowed the United States military use of a Black Sea base for 
KC-135 tanker operations.105  In accordance with Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, an 
attack on any one signatory is taken as an attack on all. The United States invoked this 
article and the NATO governments agreed. The British contributed Special Forces units, 
warships, and aircraft flying out of Oman, including an AWACS aircraft. Most other 
nations provided peacekeeping forces after the new government had been installed at 
Kabul. The Russians and Chinese also supported the war on terrorism. Russia helped arm 
the Northern Alliance.106 
Bagram Air Base is located in the Parvan Province approximately 11 kilometers 
(7 miles) southeast of the city of Charikar and 47 Kilometers (27 miles) north of Kabul. 
The Airfield is served by a 10,000 foot runway built in 1976 capable of serving large 
cargo and bomber aircraft. 
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Bagram Air Base has three large hangars, a control tower, and numerous support 
buildings. There are over 32 acres of ramp space. There are five aircraft dispersal areas 
with a total of over 110 revetments. Many support buildings and base housing built by the 
Soviets, have been destroyed by years of fighting between the various warring Afghan 
factions.  
It played a key role during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, serving as a base 
of operations for troops and supplies and Aircraft based at Bagram provided close air 
support for Soviet and Afghan troops in the field. Some of the Soviet forces based out of 
Bagram included the elite 105th Guards Airborne Division.  It also has three camps on 
the base property operated by Army and Marine units. 
E. CONCLUSION   
Another issue for United States policy that has taken center stage since the 
collapse of the SU is the size of military personnel and bases.  The number and locations 
of United States bases were justified during the Cold War, but the level of threat has 
decreased and technological advances have called into question what the true requirement 
is.   
The New York Times provided daily updates following the terrorist attack under 
the heading “A Nation Challenged” and the first report concerning basing in Kyrgyzstan 
with a comprehensive description of the current leaders and lack of diplomatic interest.  
“The focus on military cooperation rather than promotion of democracy proved a success, 
with none of the five Central Asian leaders—almost all of them holdovers from the 
Soviet era—displaying much interest in Jeffersonian ideals.”107 
By January 8, 2002 the tone in the next article to appear in the New York Times, 
had changed.  “Even as the air war in Afghanistan wanes…the United States is preparing 
a military presence in Central Asia that could last for years” the article begins.  The 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz is quoted as saying United States presence 
“…may be more political than actually military” and that President Bush after criticizing 
the Clinton Administration for spreading the military too thin in overseas deployments 
during the 2000 campaign now had a “broader shift” versus just being a reversal of 
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policy.108  As expected, by January the use of names and positions appears, but 
surprisingly the purpose and duration shifted without much fanfare. 
This is a good place to look at global reports.  The French Press Agency reported 
ten days after the New York Times article that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was 
quoted saying it would be “premature to think about where one might have permanent 
bases or something like that, something physical.”  The press release then went on to 
point out the contradiction between the Defense Secretary and his deputy.109  There were 
also interviews of United States civilian strategic experts, professors and a Russian 
military officer—all with varying opinions on United States intentions.  The New York 
Times article only used United States government officials and military officers.  
Interestingly, the French Press Agency noted the New York Times article.   
On February 9, The Washington Post provided a more in-depth look citing the 
one year Status of Forces agreement negotiated with the Kyrgyz government and the 
inclusion of landing fees and costs.  This article also pointed out potential problems by 
noting that “maintaining bases in largely Muslim Central and southwestern Asia could 
backfire” not unlike the situation with Osama bin Laden and United States presence in 
Saudi Arabia.110  The contradictions continue.  The Federal Information and News 
Dispatch, Inc. on behalf of the State Department released text and meeting minutes from 
the Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones on February 11, following her trip to 
Central Asia.  “We are not looking for, we don’t want, United States bases in Central 
Asia.  We don’t want a United States base anywhere,” Jones said.111  This document is 
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America needed external coalition partners for two key reasons.  One was 
operational—the United States needed intelligence on the Taliban and Pakistan and Saudi 
Arabia had information.  The other reason was that the United States required access to 
airspace and bases. 
By mid-October 2001, 44 countries had provided over flight permission and 33 
had provided landing rights. In addition, 36 offered military forces or equipment for raids 
against the Taliban, and 14 had accepted United States forces on their territory. Special 
Forces were deployed to Afghanistan by Britain, Australia, and Canada.  All these 
countries were helpful in the cause against the Taliban; however, none were absolutely 
essential in that they did not hold veto power over American action.  This was a key 
because countries may have felt pressured to veto American activity based on 
Muslim/Arab ties. As it turned out, American sea power provided mobile bases near 
Afghanistan in international waters, and the United States conducted the initial phase of 
the war prior to completing assembly of the coalition.  Since the United States 
demonstrated it would conduct the war on its own if necessary, it freed many countries 




































While it may be true that access issues have never stopped an operation in which 
the United States was seriously committed, without access, the operation becomes more 
difficult and more costly.  Access may be afforded by various methods; however, there is 
no such thing as assured access.112  If we wish to avoid being either surprised or 
overextended, we need extensive peacetime engagement with likeminded foreign 
militaries and governments, so that in wartime we can fight with them and gain access to 
those theaters.  This effort must be seen as a critical factor of our strategy. 
The Air Force is heavily dependent on overseas bases for its wartime 
effectiveness.  But the number of foreign bases to which that service has access has 
declined over 80 percent since the height of the Cold War, and all of the 30 or so bases 
that remain are subject to political constraints on their use.  In many areas of the world, 
such as Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, and southern Africa, the Air Force does 
not have assured access to a single nearby base.  The base-access issue is likely to grow 
worse in the future as the interests of the United States and its allies diverge.  Indeed, 
experience suggests the prepackaged presence of United States forces at foreign bases 
can contribute to such a divergence by becoming a political embarrassment for the host 
government.113  Additionally, the costs associated with establishing and running a base 
are very significant in the early stages, although historically the host country provides 
some financial incentives to maintain presence in the form of paying local national  
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salaries, reduced lease for land, and agreements to pay for significant repairs of the assets 
used to support their country.  The potential for these benefits to come to fruition in 
Central Asia is next to none.   
Unlike the Cold War, the United States focus is on the ability to move to the fight 
not fight in place.  The September 11 attacks clarified that the key security challenges 
that will be faced in the 21st century are:  the nexus among terrorist organizations, their 
state supporters and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; ungoverned and under-
governed areas within states; and asymmetric warfare that adversaries will use to counter 
conventional military superiority.  The United States Global Defense Posture has five key 
policy themes:  strengthened allied roles; flexibility to contend with uncertainty; focus 
within and across regions; develop rapidly deployable capabilities; and to focus on 
capabilities, not numbers. 
In August 2004, President George Bush announced plans to reposition 
approximately 70,000 United States troops from overseas bases. The president stated that 
American forces are more agile, more lethal, and more capable of striking anywhere 
around the globe on short notice. Some of these troops would be withdrawn, others 
positioned in other areas around the world to be able to quickly respond to unexpected 
threats.  United States administration officials noted that America is attempting to portray 
the strength of its commitment to its allies in terms of capabilities, not in the number of 
troops.  The technological prowess of the United States military in terms of its ability to 
project power over great distances, supports such troop withdrawals.114 
The broader plan includes eliminating a number of large United States bases from 
overseas, bringing some troops home and repositioning others abroad, while constructing 
skeletal outposts and dispersing critical equipment in regions that portend potential 
hotspots of trouble.115  The aim is to create flexible, small units that could be moved 
quickly to temporary bases.  Global threat requires a global presence.  With the terrorist 
threat based in some of the most remote locations on earth, the United States seeks to 
establish a military presence everywhere the terrorists are congregating.  The United 
States military cannot be satisfied with fighting and winning the nation’s wars, it must 
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also discourage military competition and prevent wars from starting; therefore, according 
to Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, it must be positioned around the world.116 
Confirming this global presence initiative, the United States has bases or shares 
military installations in Turkey, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United 
Arab Emirates, Oman, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Diego 
Garcia in the Indian Ocean.  These sites can serve as forward outposts that are lightly 
garrisoned with rapidly deployable units, but that can also serve as surge points for 
greater United States force build-up as required to respond to a contingency.  A larger 
majority of bases will become forward operating sites and small support staffs will 
maintain them. 
The smaller sites in remote regions will be designated as cooperative security 
locations and will not have a permanent military presence but will serve as staging areas 
for troops requiring quick access for training or for engaging a threat.  The major United 
States-led conflicts since the end of the Cold War reflect similar themes in terms of the 
keys to their success. The United States built coalitions, gaining the necessary access into 
the regions of interests and providing legitimacy for its cause; and America demonstrated 
overmatching military capability based on technological prowess, precision weapons, 
joint integration, and strategic logistics, including pre-positioned materiel in the region. 
The United States military’s strategic and logistical advantages of basing in 
Central Asia are known and are currently being used in the Global War on Terror.  
United States military presence in the form of bases coupled with lessons learned from 
previous Soviet Union occupations and political relationships can not only provide 
“bread and bullets” to our troops in harm’s way, but will also lead to increased stability 
for all of Central Asia.  As stated earlier, the military advantages of these overseas bases 
are underlined daily in the on-going Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom campaigns.  Furthermore, the respective governments have received significant 
financial support for the right of access.  The success of the bases can be narrowly 
defined in terms of operations support, but lasting impact in Central Asia will also 
include positive local impact, improved bilateral relations between countries, and 
longevity (i.e., The United States invitation to remain is, for the moment, open-ended for 
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Manas Air Base).  The successful combination of these four areas will ensure long term 
benefits for United States and Central Asian interests.   
Clausewitz noted that war is an extension of politics.  Therefore, the manager of 
violence, the military, is a tool of politics as well.  Overseas basing provides an extension 
of United States policy.  But flexibility is the key to the survival of these relatively new 
independent states of Central Asia.  Calling for democracy in these countries, while 
commendable, is potentially destabilizing.  Democracy may not answer the need for 
“effective” and “responsive” governance, which can deliver the domestic security, social 
and economic goods the populations of these countries seek and require.  Responsive and 
effective governance, let alone democratic, has been hard to establish from Eastern 
Europe, through the Middle East, Central and South Asia and Southeast Asia.  This is not 
to say that democracy was impossible, because it has certainly been fruitful in many of 
these areas, but the authoritarian governance and entrenched corruption common in 
Central Asia as a result of the Soviet system may be the rule for some time to come.  The 
United States has to exercise wisdom and patience to deal with this very real probability. 
B. THREATS TO STABILITY  
Severe poverty, repression, narcotics smuggling, corruption among key leaders, 
and a continuing rise in radical Islamic fundamentalism have led to growing instability in 
the region. Most of the region’s problems can be traced back to the pre-independence 
period, when the Soviet Union still controlled these states.  
The Soviet policies of closed borders, forced cotton agriculture, farm 
collectivization, population relocation, and-most significant-Stalin’s 
redrawing of the map of Central Asia to create five incongruous states had 
left the region economically hard-pressed, ethnically and politically 
divided, and forced to practice its majority religion-Islam-in secret.117  
Most of these problems persist today.  The leaders of the Central Asian states, 
who for the most part came to power via the Soviet communist party, still run 
authoritarian regimes in which corruption is widespread, with obvious religious 
persecution.  The region is also one of the poorest in the world, despite the abundance of 
revenue-producing energy resources. Central Asia has also become a major “highway” 
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for narcotics gangs to get their products from Afghanistan to European and Asian 
markets.  These persistent problems have led to the widespread increase in radical Islam, 
which has been perhaps the primary cause of instability in Central Asia.  The weak 
national governments of the former Soviet republics have neither the military nor the 
economic resources needed to combat these growing security problems. 
The narcotics trade in Central Asia is also a primary source of funding for militant 
Islamic groups. The IMU reportedly has been using its militants to move opium and 
heroin through the region into Russia and to their contacts in Chechnya and eventually 
onto the European market. The revenue earned from moving just a kilogram of heroin 
through Central Asia is well worth the risk in a region fraught with poverty.  According 
to retired United States Ambassador Grant Smith, “profit from moving a kilogram of 
heroin across Tajikistan, ranges from $4000 if the destination is neighboring countries, to 
$14,000 if the destination is Moscow.”118 
The issue of narcotics is important to discuss because insurgents and/or terrorists 
need capital in order to sustain operations.  They also need capital to gain the most 
important resource—people.  Without some type of popular support, these type of threats 
will eventually shrivel up and die.  American military presence can play a significant role 
in combating the grassroots campaigning that usually targets the United States as the 
source of all ills, thereby gaining significant popular support. 
Dr. John Hamre, former Deputy Secretary of Defense and now president of the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, stated,  “It appears to me that the kinds of 
changes to United States military posture that DOD is contemplating today are driven by 
operational expediency, rather than strategy.  The problem with this is that, to be 
sustainable over the long-term, United States bases overseas must be part of an overall 
political, diplomatic, and strategic framework.”119  Taking the initiative to extend 
assistance created an atmosphere where the regimes of Central Asia responded in  
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overwhelming support of United States efforts.  Current and future administrations, 
however, have to adjust United States policy to ensure stronger relationships if there is a 
desire to maintain an influence. 
C. REGIONAL LESSONS LEARNED 
The list of de-stabilizing factors also includes human rights violations, ethnic 
tensions, water rights, and the competing efforts of Russia and China.  All of these factors 
can be negatively or positively impacted by American military presence in the region.  
Each country researched for this study provided insightful information that highlights 
other ways to conduct stability operations, while still being able to accomplish strategic 
objectives. 
1. Uzbekistan 
As stated earlier, the Bush Administration made it clear that security and 
democracy are indivisible and the tenet of human rights under the umbrella of democracy 
was put to the test with the Andijan incident.  Before approaching the Uzbek regime 
about basing rights, there was already an understanding that Uzbekistan was not a 
democracy and there were known human rights violations committed by the regime.  The 
United States had a responsibility to ask itself, “How critical is this location to my overall 
strategic plan?”  It is ideological haughtiness (or foolishness) to expects a regime to 
change just because the United States is present. 
The government of Uzbekistan evicted U.S. personnel from the Karshi-Khanabad 
air base, which Washington had used as a staging ground for combat, reconnaissance, and 
humanitarian missions in Afghanistan since late 2001. The government in Tashkent gave 
no official reason for the expulsion, but the order was issued soon after the UN airlifted 
439 Uzbek refugees from Kyrgyzstan to Romania—a move that Washington supported 
and Tashkent opposed.  (The Uzbek government wanted the refugees to return home, but 
the international community did not, fearing that they would be detained and tortured by 
Uzbek security personnel.)  The showdown was the latest in a series of confrontations 
since a much-criticized crackdown on antigovernment demonstrators in the eastern city 
of Andijon last May.  These events illustrate the enduring problem that U.S. defense 
officials face as they try to promote democratic values abroad while maintaining U.S. 
military bases in non-democratic countries.  Although some in Washington acknowledge 
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this tension, they generally argue that the strategic benefits of having U.S. bases close to 
important theaters such as Afghanistan outweigh the political costs of supporting 
unsavory host regimes.  With the Pentagon now redefining the role of the U.S. military in 
the twenty-first century, moreover, its officials insist even more on the importance of 
developing a vast network of U.S. bases to confront cross-border terrorism and other 
regional threats. Some of them also turn the objections of pro-democracy critics around.  
They claim that a U.S. military presence in repressive countries gives Washington 
additional leverage to press them to liberalize. And, they argue, relying on democratic 
hosts for military cooperation can present problems of its own—such as the 2003 
parliamentary vote in Turkey that denied the United States the chance to launch its 
invasion of Iraq from there. 120 
By making formal statements condemning the existing government, the 
subsequent termination of basing privileges was a logical outcome.  Can the United 
States stand by and not address human rights violations with a country that it has 
diplomatic relations with?  Certainly not!  However, there is a way to address the issues 
without putting the regime on the defensive.  Germany has a military presence in 
Uzbekistan and it did not issue any formal statements concerning Andijan, and they are 
still operating there.  Does that make Germany any less a democracy?  Addressing 
Andijan, the way we did, pushed Karimov into the arms of Russia, and the resulting 
treaty is even stronger than relations since 1991.  Uzbekistan, the most populated, and 
arguably the most influential in the region may be lost to the United States for a long time 
to come.  The point is that battles have to be selected carefully and the level of 
engagement even more so. 
2. Kyrgyzstan   
Manas Air Base survived the Tulip Revolution and the United States was 
guaranteed continued access despite the recommendation of the SCO.  The latest obstacle 
for the United States to negotiate is the demand on behalf of Kyrgyz President Bayev that 
the United States pay 100 percent the amount it paid to the previous regime, claiming that 
Akayev was corrupt and the money is not accounted for.  A great example of the  
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corruptness imbedded within Central Asia’s regimes.  This situation will be dealt with in 
a much more thought out manner since this is the last base the United States has in this 
part of the region. 
The bulk of the operations conducted at K2 Air Base have moved to Manas Air 
Base and currently, the relationship between the base and the local population is 
agreeable.  As noted in Chapter Four, Russia has opened Kant Air Base not more than ten 
miles away and the desire for the United States to leave altogether is no secret. 
3. Afghanistan 
United States military presence in Afghanistan follows the rapid defeat of the 
Taliban and the scattering of Al Qaeda operatives.  Similar to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, the conventional defeat was very impressive.  While the initial success is to 
be lauded, the real work now begins and the United States has to steer clear of the 
impressions and patterns established by the Soviets just decades before.   
The battle for Bagram Air Base was one of the fiercest in Operation Enduring 
Freedom, and it is now the busiest military hub in Afghanistan.  Continued fighting in 
Afghanistan has the potential to place Bagram in the same position the Soviets were in—
a great operational location where personnel were generally safe inside the perimeter of 
the base and excursions outside of the base were limited to patrols and convoys from one 
base to the other.  While the United States forces have made excursions to orphanages, 
this show of good will is limited and does more for public relations for United States 
citizens than actually building relationships with the local population.  
D. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
During the occupation of Germany following World War II, the American forces 
were provided with a Pocket Guide to Germany to help educate and guide the military 
personnel’s behavior.  The guide included many points of interest, but namely excerpts 
from the occupation directive, JCS 1067, which spoke directly to the banning of 
fraternization.  For military officials the fraternization bias served as a security measure 
and a form of punishment for the German people.121 
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As with any base on foreign soil, whether by occupation or invitation, there is a 
segment of the population that views an American installation as a target.  Seeking out 
locations where potential problems may arise multiplies this factor.  Stability of the 
regime is also an area to be regarded seriously because some of these locations will have 
weak democracies (or may not be a democracy at all).  Careful consideration also has to 
be given to the interaction of the base population with the local community.  The 
government has a responsibility to ensure the security of its citizens, but also be good 
stewards of the resources at its disposal. 
U.S. armed forces, both in wartime and in peacetime, must help assure security in 
areas like Central Asia.  Any concept of United States victory in America’s current wars 
that does not also insist that those forces dominate not only the combat, but also post-
combat phases of operations to achieve strategic victory, is intrinsically wrong.  For 
example, if future contingencies necessitate the presence of United States combat forces 
in former Soviet republics, their peacetime and wartime missions could include 
engagement in protracted peace and support operations due to the strategic nature of the 
mission and the theater’s socio-political configuration. Or, if these governments do not 
succumb to insurgencies, United States forces there can perform missions to help them 
modernize their armed forces and render them increasingly interoperable with those of 
NATO. These tasks and goals include military missions to help achieve this 
interoperability and to conduct priority operations such as anti-terrorist operations, peace 
support operations, counter drug, counter proliferation operations, and border security.   
Security professionals active in these areas already embrace this expanded 
mission. They know that security includes the entire range of activities necessary to 
reconstruct viable states and societies.  Language, tour duration/rotations and overall 
asset coordination are three important areas that these security professionals (military and 
civilian) need to focus on in order to recognize success in this region.  All three are 
interconnected in the unconventional process of establishing relationships.  
1. Language Proficiency 
The Department of Defense has long recognized the importance of language 
proficiency in the intelligence field, and has already begun the process to expand the base 
number of personnel that are conversant in many languages.  As with many things, the 
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push for learning Arabic languages got a stronger push following Operation Desert 
Storm, as it was reinvigorated following the attacks of 9/11. 
As in the Great Game, the representatives from Great Britain, Russia and other 
countries that mastered the local languages of Central Asia found much better success.  In 
an effort to establish relationships and trust with a local population, to have interaction 
with the population that speaks English is only scratching at the surface.  Insurgents and 
terrorist usually have the advantage when it comes to communication.  Essentially those 
that are trying to stabilize and those trying to de-stabilize are competing for the same 
population.  Each can only be fully successful by, with and through the people.    
The United States Air Force is now making mandatory that junior officers become 
proficient in another language, it has the danger of becoming another square-filler for 
promotion without targeted languages for targeted purposes.  There is a monetary 
threshold that would encourage military members to become proficient and then know 
that their training would be used directly in the country or countries that need it. 
2. Tour Duration/Rotation 
Tours of duty in undesirable locations are usually short, six months to one year, 
with the service member trying hard not to go back.  If they do, in fact, go back, it is 
usually not to the same unit, and most certainly not with the same personnel.  The 
majority of the personnel that report to Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan are on a six to nine 
months rotation schedule with some senior leadership pulling one year tours. 
To break the conventional mindset would mean that the tours would be longer and 
that the same individuals would rotate back to the same unit and location.  With the 
exponential element of language proficiency, there is a very real opportunity to establish 
relationships.  First, with those that work on or service the base and this net widens as 
relationships grow.  The local that continues to meet different people all of the time has 
loyalty that goes as deep as the money earned.  
The traditional military mindset of having to make an impact will also have to 
take a backseat to furthering the ongoing effort to gain the trust of the people.  This is 




which in turn determines promotion.  The personnel that do rotate through these locations 
will be responsible for actively coordinating and participating in areas that are not the 
norm.  
3. Coordination with Others 
Most stability operations plans speak to the importance of working with other 
government organizations and at the least establishing liaisons with the nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) and other tenant countries as well.  Stephen Blank of the RAND 
Corporation suggests that: 
…using all the instruments of power, America, either alone or as a part of 
a coalition, will help these states expand their governing capacities and 
make them more capable of defending themselves against threats, as well 
as fostering an end to their isolation from the West.122 
The idea that America can do it alone is a dangerous assumption, especially in 
Central Asia.  Unfortunately, this is too often the case and true partnership just receives 
lip service. 
Part of the blame goes to the operations tempo at the location, but a large part 
goes to the fact that military organizations prefer not to work with other organizations.  
One of the successful “take-aways” of Great Britain’s successful counterinsurgency in 
Malaysia was the coordination of all resources (military and civilian) in the overall 
execution of the strategy.123  If security and stability are truly the end states, there are 
some great insights and connections that a Colin Lober who is in Kyrgyzstan working for 
the Peace Corp can provide a military unit.  Each organization, from the embassy to the 
American Red Cross has a piece of the overall picture that if truly coordinated, could 
make a big difference.    
In considering how to approach local regimes, we must take care to tailor United 
States programs to the needs of each country.  At the same time, those programs should 
reinforce each other as part of a coordinated larger regional strategy.  For instance, we 
must avoid future situations such as has occurred with Uzbekistan where the United 
States State Department was legally obligated to suspend aid to the military―one of the 
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more Westernizing institutions there―because of the government’s antidemocratic  
policies. But shortly thereafter, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard 
Myers (USAF) visited Uzbekistan, praised the government as an American ally, and 
transferred weapons to it.124  
While one can defend each of these actions on its own merits, they create an 
impression that our policies are incoherent, not truly interested in Uzbekistan’s 
democratization, and that the Uzbek regime can disregard calls for democratization 
because of our alliance with it, leading Uzbeks to think that we were not serious and can 
therefore be played. 
Hence, the need for well-conceived interagency and multidimensional strategy of 
engagement becomes apparent.  That strategy should assign priorities to our engagement 
with local governments and make them known to avoid such embarrassments. 
E. OVERALL CONCLUSION OF POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The United States will have to move outside of its conventional paradigm 
concerning military presence if it is to have longevity in Central Asia.  The desire for 
security, or stability, in the region has to be stronger than the push for democracy.  
Security is cemented in control.  Control has three distinct requirements:  1) having the 
capability to see everything 2) having the capability to reach out and touch everything 
seen, and 3) possessing the will to do what is necessary to maintain control.  The level of 
control realized is in direct correlation to stability.  Clearly, the United States has very 
little control in Central Asia, but the potential to gain access is an important first step.  
This thesis presented some unconventional proposals for military presence—not 
necessarily new, but rarely part of the military presence strategy.  Clearly, Russia is 
gaining military influence in Central Asia.  The addition of two new bases and the 
promise of more, and the strengthening of the CST with the CSTO show this to be true.     
Foreign to conventional thought, the presence of Russia adds stability to the 
region which supports our security goals.  Russia’s support of the regimes in power 
lowers the chance of a violent regime change.  The presence of Russian military forces 
also lowers the chance of radical Islamic violence.  Its assistance to border patrolling  
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limits drug trafficking and illegal immigration.  The Russian military currently has a low 
budget and its operational capability may be limited, but any help benefits the Central 
Asian countries.   
While not all of us may be able to grow a beard, get tanned and blend in with the 
peoples of Central Asia like Professor Tom Johnson, a concerted effort to invest the 
funding and unconventional thought can produce positive changes.  All of the 
suggestions presented here require time—a commodity that is very precious and current 
United States administrations and military policies don’t allow for.  Again, as in the 
Malaysian success story, the counterinsurgency took twelve years to complete.  How 
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